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Abstract
The dissertation consists of three chapters relating to pricing strategies. Chapter 1
studies coupons for prescription drugs and their impacts on consumer welfare, firm
profits, and insurance payments. Chapter 2 examines consumer brand loyalty and
learning in pharmaceutical demand and discusses implications for marketing and
health care policy. Chapter 3 develops a framework for estimating demand and
supply in an online market with many competing sellers and frequent price changes
and proposes optimal pricing strategies for a large seller.
The first chapter studies an innovative price strategy in pharmaceuticals. Branded
drug manufacturers have recently started to issue copay coupons as part of their
strategy to compete with generics when their branded drugs are coming off patent.
To explore the welfare implications of copay coupons, I estimate a model of demand
and supply using pharmaceutical data on sales, prices, advertising, and copayments
for cholesterol-lowering drugs and perform a counterfactual analysis where a branded
manufacturer introduces coupons. The model allows flexible substitution patterns
and consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivities and preferences for branded drugs.
The counterfactuals quantify the effects of copay coupons for different assumptions
about the take-up of coupons and the ability of the branded manufacturer to di-
rect them to the most price-sensitive types of consumers. The results show that
the agency problem between insurers and patients gives a branded manufacturer a
strong incentive to issue copay coupons. Introducing copay coupons benefits the
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coupon issuer and consumers but raises insurance payments. In equilibrium, insurer
spending can increase by as much as 25% even when just 5% of consumers have a
coupon, with social welfare falling significantly.
Medicines for chronic conditions like high cholesterol, heart disease, and diabetes
are repeatedly used for a long period of time. Consumer dynamics thus plays an
important role in the demand for those drugs. In the second chapter, I estimate a
demand model with brand loyalty and learning using micro-level data from choles-
terol lowering drug markets in the United States. The estimates suggest high switch-
ing costs and strong learning effects at the molecule level in the markets. Switching
costs raise the predicted probability of choosing the same drugs in a row and learning
largely increases patient stickiness to a molecule in the long run. I discuss pricing
implications of the estimation results for drug manufacturers, insurance companies,
and policy makers.
The last chapter, coauthored with Dr. Andrew Sweeting and Dr. James W.
Roberts, looks at pricing in a different context. We estimate a model of entry,
exit and pricing decisions in an online market for event tickets where there are many
competing sellers and prices change frequently. We use the estimates from our model
to analyze the optimality of the pricing policy used by the largest seller (broker) in
the market. We show that the broker’s pricing policies substantially affect the prices
set by his competitors. When we compare the broker’s pricing policy with the prices
that our model predicts are optimal we find that the broker sets approximately
correct prices close to the game, when his pricing problem resembles a static one,
but that he might be able to gain from using different pricing rules and updating
prices more frequently further from the game.
v
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1A Welfare Analysis of Copay Coupons in
Pharmaceuticals
1.1 Introduction
Coupons have long been prevalent in consumer goods, but recently they also started
to play an important role in the pharmaceutical industry. The coupons distributed
by drug manufacturers, called copay coupons or copay cards, reduce consumers’ out-
of-pocket costs of prescription drugs. Many top-selling drugs, including cholesterol
fighter Lipitor, blood thinner Plavix, and blood pressure drug Diovan, started to
offer copay coupons as they were coming off patent in recent years. Analysts es-
timate about 13% of branded prescriptions were associated with copay coupons in
2011.1 The number of prescriptions filled with copay coupons is expected to increase
approximately 15% per year.2 Despite the fast growing use of copay coupons, little
empirical work has been done to examine the welfare implications of this new strat-
egy. In this paper, I provide a counterfactual analysis of how copay coupons affect
1 “Copay Cards Could Be Win-Win if All Sides Work Together,” Drug Benefit News, July 22,
2011.
2 “How Copay Coupons Could Raise Prescription Drug Costs by $32 Billion Over the Next
Decade,” Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, November 2011.
1
consumer welfare, firm profits and insurance payments, using a model estimated with
data from the market for cholesterol-lowering drugs.
The study focuses on a new incentive to issue coupons: the agency problem
between insurers and patients in pharmaceuticals. Coupons are widely used by firms
in other industries to compete for price-sensitive consumers. By distributing coupons
in a market, firms can rely on consumer self-selection to achieve market segmentation
and increase profits. Narasimhan (1984) shows that coupon users are more price
sensitive than nonusers and firms could thus offer coupon users a lower price and raise
the price for nonusers, allowing for price discrimination. The special market structure
in the pharmaceutical industry gives drug manufacturers another incentive to use
coupons. For prescription drugs, doctors and patients make the purchase decision
and insurance companies pay for most of the drug costs. Insurance companies in
the U.S. usually ask for a lower cost share from patients for less expensive drugs
to reduce spending. By issuing copay coupons directly to doctors and patients,
drug manufacturers can lower the out-of-pocket cost for patients and induce them
to choose the drugs with coupons even though this may increase the cost to the
insurance company. In this paper, I use counterfactuals to explore both the effects
of this agency issue and how the ability to target coupons to particular types of
consumer can affect the profitability of this strategy.
The welfare effects of copay coupons hinge on the substitution patterns in phar-
maceuticals. To capture the key features in the markets, I estimate a model with
rich substitution patterns and consumer heterogeneity in both price sensitivities and
preference for branded drugs, using unique datasets on sales, advertising, and co-
payments. The model captures competition among drugs in various ways, including
classes, molecules, forms and brandedness. Also, the model allows consumers’ price
sensitivities and preference for branded drugs to be drawn from a binary distribu-
tion. The consumer heterogeneity helps to explain why branded drug prices usually
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stay high after patent expiration. The estimates show that (1) the substitution is
strongest among drugs with the same molecules, and (2) consumers who have a
preference for branded drugs are less price sensitive.
The counterfactual results show that copay coupons have a large impact on social
welfare even when only a small fraction of consumers get them. I simulate the
outcomes of a copay coupon program introduced by the manufacturer of a branded
cholesterol-lowering drug after patent expiration. I consider different assumptions
about the take-up of coupons and the ability of the branded manufacturer to direct
them to the most price-sensitive types of consumers. In the baseline case, coupon
users and nonusers are equally price sensitive. In the targeting case, coupon users
are more price sensitive. I find that, in the baseline case, the firm that introduces
copay coupons would set a very low copay for coupon users and raise the full price
to reap a large profit from insurers. In equilibrium, consumers gain from the lower
copay by using coupons but most of the other drug manufacturers’ profits shrink as
the coupon program expands. Insurance payments increase by 25% when only 5%
of consumers have a coupon. The net effect of copay coupons on social welfare is
negative due to the large increase in insurance payments.
In the targeting case, copay coupons help to segment markets when the branded
manufacturer offer coupons to more price-sensitive consumers. Most of branded drug
manufacturers make a larger profit by exploiting the lower price-sensitivity of those
without a coupon and charging them a higher price. The copay coupon thus mitigates
price competition among branded drugs and improve their profits. At the same time,
the higher prices faced by those without a coupon lowers the overall consumer welfare
gain. The net effects of copay coupons on social welfare do not change much when I
include the ability to target coupons to price-sensitive consumers.
The paper contributes to the literature on couponing by considering a new in-
centive for using coupons. Theoretical work by Holmes (1989) and Corts (1998)
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show that offering coupons could help price discrimination in an oligopoly setting
since coupons attract price-sensitive consumers. Under certain conditions, such price
discrimination will lead to higher prices and profits. Narasimhan (1984) empirically
finds that coupon users are more price-sensitive than nonusers. Another empirical
study by Nevo and Wolfram (2002) shows that coupons can spur price competition
and lower shelf prices when they are widely available. Unlike typical coupons, copay
coupons in pharmaceuticals can lead to higher drug prices because of an agency prob-
lem between insurers and patients. In this industry, consumers or patients share only
a small portion of drug costs, and I show how this tends to increase the profitability
of a coupon.
In addition, the structural model in the paper incorporates two important fea-
tures for pharmaceutical demand estimation. First, I apply a generalized extreme
value (GEV) model developed by Bresnahan et al. (1997) to capture substitution
patterns along different dimensions. Arcidiacono et al. (2013) use a similar model
to study the welfare impacts of me-too and generic drugs. The model has a nesting
structure that allows for consumer switching based on different drug characteris-
tics, including molecule, class, branded/generic, and form. This strength facilitates
simulation of introducing copay coupons since the model captures how consumers’
choices change given the new pricing strategy. Second, following Berry et al. (2006)
in their analysis of airline industry, I consider two types of consumers who differ
in their price sensitivities and choice sets. The consumer heterogeneity could help
to explain branded drugs’ pricing after they lose patent protection. Also, the con-
sumer heterogeneity makes it possible to separate the motivations of couponing. In
the two-type framework, I can control for coupon users’ type and examine how the
agency problem between insurers and patients would affect equilibrium prices when
copay coupons are used.
Finally, the unique datasets used in the demand estimation of this paper cover
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major aspects in pharmaceuticals, including prescription drug sales, physician ad-
vertising, direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), and copayments. Jayawardhana
(2013) is one of the few empirical studies that use these rich data in demand esti-
mation for pharmaceuticals. Most of the other papers in pharmaceutical literature
use a single source of advertising to represent the marketing from drug manufactur-
ers and/or include full prices in demand. In the case of cholesterol lowering drugs
considered in this paper, DTCA and physician advertising both play an important
role in marketing and adding them can help to explain substitutions among drugs.
Additionally, copayments are the actual prices faced by consumers. Using full prices
in demand estimation would underestimate the price coefficient. The data on co-
payments also helps to build the relationship between full prices and copayments
and facilitate counterfactuals in which firms change full prices to affect insurance
copayments and demand for drugs when copay coupons are introduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides industry
background and relevant information about copay coupons. Section 1.3 describes
data. Section 1.4 develops models for demand, supply, and copayments. Section 1.5
discusses estimation strategies and estimation results. Section 1.6 presents counter-
factuals for introducing copay coupons under two scenarios. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Copay Coupons in Pharmaceuticals
Copay coupons are instantaneous rebates to patients usually offered by branded drug
manufacturers. They are distributed on drug manufacturers’ websites or provided
by sales representatives through doctors’ offices. The coupons reduce patients’ co-
payments when they fill a prescription at pharmacies. Suppose one-month supply
of a branded drug costs $150 and its generic alternative costs $30. A patient’s in-
surance copayments for the two drugs are $40 and $10, respectively. Without a
copay coupon, the patient, who is indifferent between the branded drug and generic
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alternative, would choose the less expensive generic and the insurer pays $20 for the
prescription. If the branded drug manufacturer gives a copay coupon that reduces
the out-of-pocket cost to $5, the patient would choose the branded drug and the in-
surer must pay $110. In this case, the branded drug manufacturer helps the patient
to pay $35 for the copayment and earns $110 from the insurer.
Many branded drug manufacturers started to offer copay coupons as their drugs
were losing patent protection in recent years. In December 2010, Pfizer launched
a “Lipitor for You” program which allowed patients to pay as little as $4 for a
month’s supply of Lipitor, the best-selling drug in the history of pharmaceuticals.
One month’s supply of Lipitor normally has a retail price of $150 and the copay
for generic Lipitor is about $10. Thus, the $4 copay program offered by Pfizer was
very attractive, helping to keep about one-third of Lipitor’s prescriptions within five
months of its patent expiration in late 2011.3 Many top-selling drugs followed the
strategy as they were coming off patent, including blood thinner Plavix and blood
pressure drug Diovan. Spending on copay coupons in 2011 is estimated to be $4
billion.4 This is close to the aggregate spending on direct-to-consumer advertising
($4.3 billion) and accounts for two percent of gross branded drug sales in U.S.
Copay coupons can help to combat generic entry by lowering the costs for pa-
tients and influencing doctors’ decisions. In March 2013, 53.5% of the 374 copay
coupons found from www.internetdrugcoupons.com, a large drug coupon website,
are for branded drugs with generic alternatives.5 As many blockbuster drugs are
going off-patent by 2015 and few new drugs are available to replace the revenue lost
from patent expiration, branded drug companies have worked hard to retain their
3 “New Coupons Aim To Keep People Off Generic Drugs,” Associated Press, August 20, 2012.
4 http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=755091
5 Among the copay coupon programs, 53.5% are from drugs with within-class generic alternatives,
8.3% are from drugs with FDA-approved therapeutic equivalents, and 38.2% are from drugs without
lower cost alternatives. Source: Ross, J. S., and A. Kesselheim (2013): “Prescription-Drug Coupons
- No Such Thing as a Free Lunch,” The New England Journal of Medicine, 369, 1188-1189.
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revenue after generics enter the market. Copay coupons can help to price compete
with generics without cutting the full branded prices. Using copay coupons, branded
drugs need to pay part of the out-of-pocket cost for patients. Since patients’ share
is usually less than one-third of full drug price, the benefit from insurance payments
usually exceeds the cost of copay coupons. In addition, a report by Credit Lyonnais
Securities Asia (CLSA) revealed that that 80% of physicians polled were more likely
to prescribe a drug with a copay coupon.6 Therefore, copay coupons could effectively
influence doctors’ decision to use brand-name drugs over generics by paying part of
the copayment for patients.
The “shadow claims system” of copay coupons further contributes to their pop-
ularity. In the shadow system, prescription information is first sent to a pharmacy
benefit manager (PBM), who processes prescription drug claims for employers, for
adjudication. After the PBM adjudicates the prescription and sends the copay in-
formation back to the pharmacy, copay coupon programs reduce the copay for the
coupon user. Thus, copay coupon programs are invisible to PBM’s or insurers.7
Because of the invisibility of copay coupon programs, insurers could not reject the
use of copay coupons unless they remove the drug completely from their prescription
drug list.
Copay coupons are banned in federal health programs, including Medicaid and
Medicare, because they are considered illegal kickbacks that encourage unnecessary
spending.8 In the commercial market, Massachusetts had been the only state that
prohibited copay coupons. However, in 2012 the Massachusetts government loos-
6 http://www.uhc.com/pharmacy/news_and_updates/drug_copay_coupons.htm
7 “How Copay Coupons Could Raise Prescription Drug Costs by $32 Billion Over the Next
Decade,” Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, November 2011.
8 The prohibition does not apply to the insurance sold through the online health insurance mar-
ketplaces which began on October 1, 2013. The United States Department of Health and Human
Services held that the insurance offered through the exchanges is not federal health care program
subject to the prohibition.
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ened the restriction by allowing manufacturers of branded drugs without competing
generic equivalents to offer coupons.
1.3 Data
Data are obtained from four sources. First, data on pharmaceutical sales are pro-
vided by IMS Health. In the data, I observe national retail dollars and unit sales of
each molecule/form/strength combination at monthly frequency from January 2003
to August 2011. Drug manufacturers and whether a drug is branded or generic are
also provided in the data. Second, physician advertising data from Encuity Research
contain monthly product level spending on detailing, medical journal advertising,
and events and meetings.9 Direct-to-consumer advertising data are obtained from
Ad$pender database from Kantar Media. In the data set, they have monthly adver-
tising spending for each product/media/market combination from January 2003 to
August 2011. The media include television, radio, magazines, newspaper, internet
and outdoor. There are national advertising as well as local advertising. For most
of the drugs in the research, the spending is concentrated on national advertising.
Thus, local advertising is ignored. Finally, copayment data are obtained from the
MarketScan Research Databases through National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER). The files have prescription level claim data on copayments and full prices
from about 150 employers, covering 40 million enrollees in the United States.10
I focus on the markets of HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (statins), the major
cholesterol medicines or lipid regulators. There are several reasons to look at this
market for research on copay coupons. First, the cholesterol drug market is large.
Cholesterol drugs were the third largest therapeutic class by spending in 2011, at
9 Free sample data are available only after January 2007, so they are ignored.
10 The data only cover privately insured individuals and do not include prescription drug claims
from Medicare or Medicaid. The data limitation may lead to overestimated copayments for an
average patient since generic utilization is higher in Medicare Part D plans.
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20.1 billion US dollars. There were over 260 million prescriptions filled in 2011 and
nearly 20 million Americans regularly used a cholesterol medicine.11 Second, choles-
terol medicines ranked first in spending on direct-to-consumer advertising among all
therapeutic classes in years 2009 to 2011. Cholesterol drug manufacturers together
spent on average 500 million dollars each year on DTCA.12 This is evidence that firms
in the cholesterol drug market care a lot about communication with consumers. Fi-
nally, entry of generics further intensified competition and adds to variation in pricing
and advertising.13 Two of the ten statins lost patent protection during the sample
period and their generic versions entered right after their patent expiration. En-
try of generic drugs dramatically changes the competitive environment, creating an
opportunity to learn how consumers switch from branded drugs to generics.
The statins in the sample and their relevant facts are summarized in Table 1.1.
The variations in class, molecule, form, and whether generics are available serve as
the basis for modeling substitution among drugs. There are two classes: statins
and statin combinations. Statins entered the market early in 1987 and statin com-
binations are relatively new as a treatment for high cholesterol. Statins combined
with other molecules are treated as a different class since the combinations may have
different effects on patients. Also, drugs in the classes come in three forms: tablet,
sustained-action tablet, and capsule. Sustained-action is a mechanism that helps to
dissolve a drug over time and release it more slowly and steadily into bloodstream so
that a patient could take drugs less frequently. Because of the convenience from this
mechanism, some consumers may prefer drugs in sustained-action tablet to drugs in
tablet or capsule. Finally, three of the statins (Zocor, Pravachol and Mevacor) have
11 The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, IMS Institute.
12 Source: Kantar Media A$Spender Database
13 In this paper, entry is treated as exogenous. Adding a model of entry would complicate the
analysis because a dynamic model would be needed for entry and this is beyond the scope of the
paper.
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generic alternatives. They all have a maximum number of generic equivalents greater
than ten, implying severe within-molecule competition after patents expire. I treat
the generics from different firms as separate products in the model for demand and
supply.14
Note that Pfizer launched the “Lipitor for You” program and started to distribute
copay coupons in December 2010. There are nine months of sales data in which some
prescriptions for Lipitor may be associated with copay coupons. Since coupon use is
not observable in the data, I do not consider the impacts of Lipitor’s copay coupons
in the estimation.
1.3.1 Sales and Prices
Figure 1.1 presents sales measured by patient-days. To make drugs with different
strengths comparable in sales, I transform unit sales into patient-days by dividing
the total number of milligrams sold by the recommended daily dosage.15 The market
grows over time with introduction of new drugs as well as entry of generics. The
three major drugs are atorvastatin (Lipitor), simvastatin (Zocor), and rosuvastatin
(Crestor). Zocor loses its patent protection in mid 2006. Within half a year after
the patent expires, generic simvastatin quickly takes over the market of Zocor and
expands the overall statin share. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) dominates the market until
late 2006 when many generic simvastatins are available. The steady growth in the
market share of Crestor, rolled out in 2003, also contributes to drops in the other
branded drugs’ sales.
14 Some of the generics are “authorized generics,” which are approved by FDA as brand-name drugs
but marketed as generic drugs. According to a FTC report on authorized generics, pricing decisions
by outside licensees typically are independent of the brand. The report also provides evidence of
competition between authorized generics and their branded counterpart. In my data, all authorized
generics are independent licensees. Thus, I treat them as competitors to the branded drug with the
same molecule.
15 The daily recommended dosage data are obtained from Clinical Pharmacology, an online
database for drug information widely used by hospitals and retail pharmacies in US.
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Figure 1.2 shows prices per patient-day. All prices are adjusted to January 2003
dollars. Most branded drugs have a price between one and three dollars per patient-
day. Prices are quite stable for drugs under patent protection. In contrast, drugs
with generic alternatives experience some price changes. Prices of branded simvas-
tatin (Zocor), pravastatin (Pravachol) and lovastatin (Mevacor) tend to fall slightly
as generics just enter but they move back to the original level when generic compe-
tition intensifies and generic prices become very low. The pricing pattern suggests
that branded drugs would price compete with generics for the general consumers
when there are only a few generics available. As many generics enter the markets,
they choose to concentrate on the consumers with a strong preference for branded
products.
Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics for the full sample as well as the sub-
samples for branded drugs both with and without generic equivalents, and generics.
Each observation is a combination of month, molecule, brandedness, form, and man-
ufacturer. Generics from different manufacturers are treated separately. On average,
branded drugs without generic equivalents have the highest price and largest market
share. The market share of branded drugs becomes much lower after generic entry
while their prices are only slightly lower than before generics enter. Generic prices
are on average one fourth of branded prices. An average generic accounts for 0.5%
of market, compared to 2% for an average branded drug under patent protection.
This shows that even if there are many branded drugs in the markets, patents still
protect drugs from severe competition. After a patent expires, a large number of
generic entrants simply take over the market from branded drugs.
1.3.2 Advertising
Figure 1.3 demonstrates the patterns of advertising to physicians and Figure 1.4
for direct-to-consumer advertising. Spending on advertising to physicians is the
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aggregate spending on detailing, journal advertising, and events and conferences.
Direct-to-consumer advertising spending is the sum over national advertising spend-
ing through various channels. Also, only the four most advertised branded drugs are
included because the advertising spending by the other products is relatively small.
First note that physician advertising and DTCA spending for branded rosuvastatin
is very large in the first few months of rollout to inform doctors and consumers of
the existence of the new drug. Second, branded simvastatin and pravastatin start to
cut advertising spending as their patent expiration dates approach. Their physician
advertising spending drops to a very low level after generics become available. The
drop in DTCA spending happens about one year before their patents expire. Ta-
ble 1.2 shows that on average branded drugs’ advertising spending is only 6% of the
advertising spending before generics enter. These patterns imply that branded drugs
have little incentive to invest in advertising after patent expires since consumers and
physicians encouraged by advertising to use the drugs may choose the less expen-
sive generic versions. Also, the patterns are consistent with the strategic investment
story discussed in Ellison and Ellison (2007). Branded drug manufacturers have an
incentive to reduce advertising to make a market less attractive to generic entrants
although it is not clear that the strategy is effective in this case.
1.4 Model
In this section, I discuss the models of demand, supply, and copayments. I consider
a random-coefficient discrete-choice demand model. The error structure is based on
the model used in Bresnahan et al. (1997), which allows unobserved preferences to be
correlated across multiple nests. By differentiating products along multiple dimen-
sions, we can capture rich substitution patterns among drugs. To capture consumer
heterogeneity in their preference for branded drugs, I use a simple two-type version of
the random-coefficient model following Berry et al. (2006). Also, I construct a static
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supply side model to estimate marginal costs, identify some parameters for consumer
heterogeneity, and to more precisely estimate the parameters from demand. Finally,
the model for copayments builds the relationship between full price and out-of-pocket
costs for consumers.
Before discussing the model set-up, it is worth being clear about a couple of
limitations of the current analysis. First, like most of the literature on pharmaceutical
demand, I assume that doctors and patients jointly make decisions to maximize
utility. Thompson (1993) discusses that conflicts of interest between physicians and
patients could arise from gifts given by drug companies to physicians, physicians’
risk sharing in health maintenance organizations and hospitals, research on patients,
etc. In recent years, government intervention and self-regulation by pharmaceutical
industry have aimed to alleviate the problem and the conflicts of interest could be
less serious.16 Second, I do not try to consider how the use of coupons affects the
entry of either branded or generic drugs. This could be addressed by adding an
endogenous entry model to the current framework, but I leave this type of question
to future work.
1.4.1 Demand
In the demand model, a consumer makes a discrete choice given a set of product char-
acteristics. The consumer here refers to the combination of patients and doctors. I
assume that they make joint decisions to maximize utility and ignore the possi-
ble principal-agent problem.17 A product here is a combination of molecule, form,
16 For example, The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, effective on August 1, 2013, requires man-
ufacturers of drugs that participate in U.S. federal health care programs to report certain payments
and items of value given to physicians. In 2008, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) strengthened the Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals to en-
sure that biopharmaceutical marketing practices comply with the highest ethical and professional
standards.
17 Lack of micro-level data on prescribing prohibits me from distinguishing the two roles in decision
making.
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brandedness, and firm. There are four dimensions along which products are differen-
tiated: classes, branded/generic, molecules, and forms. As shown in Table 1.1, drugs
of different molecules can be classified into statins and statin combinations. Three
molecules have generic versions and two molecules have multiple forms.
An individual in period t chooses from Jt products, indexed j  1, 2, ..., Jt. The
indirect utility consumer i obtains from j in period t is
uijt  αip
c
jt   x
1
jtβ   µj   ξjt   ijt, (1.1)
where pcjt is the copay for product j in time t, and xjt is a set of time-varying
observed product characteristics. µj is product fixed effect and ξjt is a time-varying
component that captures unobserved demand shocks. Idiosyncratic taste parameter,
ijt, is assumed to be independent across consumers but correlated among products.
The mean utility for product j in time t is δjt  x1jtβ   µj   ξjt. Consumers have an
outside option, which includes non-drug treatments and no treatment. I normalize
the utility of the consumer from this outside option to zero because I cannot identify
relative utility levels.
The vector xjt has several time-varying components that may affect consumer
utility. First, I include the logarithm of physician advertising spending by product
j in time t, logp1   ADjtq, and the logarithm of DTCA spending, logp1   ACjtq.
Allowing advertising spending to enter directly to consumer utility, I assume that the
two types of advertising have persuasive effects.18 Second, to consider the spillover
effects of advertising, I add physician advertising and DTCA spending from the
other drugs with the same molecule, logp1   ADOTjtq and logp1   ACOTjtq. These
two variables help explain the branded drugs’ advertising pattern close to patent
expiration date, since free-riding of generics on branded advertising would reduce
18 While literature on DTCA suggests that DTCA is more informative than persuasive, allowing the
informative role of DTCA can complicate the model and largely increase computational burden. The
DTCA here can be better viewed as a variable to control for time-varying product characteristics.
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the incentive to invest in advertising. Third, I include time dummies for each period
and time-since-entry dummies for each of the first twenty four months after drug
entry. Time dummies capture the change in the quality of outside goods and time-
since-entry dummies handle increasing consumer awareness of the existence of a new
drug.
I model two types of consumers who differ in their choice sets and price sensi-
tivities. High type consumers are assumed to have a strong preference for branded
drugs and they consider only branded drugs. Low type consumers make a choice
among all drugs available.19 The price coefficient αi is
αi 
#
αH if i is high type
αL if i is low type
. (1.2)
The consumer heterogeneity helps explain price differentials between branded and
generic drugs. In the absence of consumer heterogeneity, the high price of branded
drugs after patent expiration would be captured by a jump in marginal cost, which is
not consistent with intuition. Moreover, estimating two types of consumers enables
me to explore how coupon targeting affects welfare changes from copay coupons in
the counterfactual in which coupon users are all low type.
To allow ijt to be correlated among products, I follow McFadden et al. (1978)
and assume the unobserved idiosyncratic parameter has a generalized extreme value
(GEV) distribution with multivariate cumulative distribution function
F pi0t, i1t, ..., iJtq  exp rG pei0t , ei1t , ..., eiJtqs ,
which implies that the market share of product j in time t from the high type is
19 The assumption on the consumer heterogeneity in choice sets is equivalent to including a dummy
variable in high type’s indirect utility and forcing the coefficient on the dummy variable to be
negative infinity.
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given by
sHjt 
eδjt α
HpcjtGHj

eδi0t , eδi1t α
Hpc1t , ..., eδiJt α
HpcJt
	
GH
 
eδi0t , eδi1t α
Hpc1t , ..., eδiJt α
HpcJt
 , (1.3)
where GHj is the partial derivative of GH with respect to the jth argument. Similarly
the market share of product j in time t from the low type is given by
sLjt 
eδjt α
LpcjtGLj

eδi0t , eδi1t α
Lpc1t , ..., eδiJt α
LpcJt
	
GL
 
eδi0t , eδi1t α
Lpc1t , ..., eδiJt α
LpcJt
 . (1.4)
Following Bresnahan et al. (1997), I specify GH and GL as
GH

eδi0t , eδi1t α
Hpc1t , ..., eδiJt α
HpcJt
	
 eδ0t 
¸
l
al
¸
k
¸
j
Ipj, k, lqBRANDje
δjt α
Hpc
jt
ρl
ρlff
(1.5)
GL

eδi0t , eδi1t α
Lpc1t , ..., eδiJt α
LpcJt
	
 eδ0t  
¸
l
al
¸
k
¸
j
Ipj, k, lqe
δjt α
Lpc
jt
ρl
ρlff
,
(1.6)
where Ipj, k, lq is an indicator variable taking on the value of one if product j has
the kth value of the ltj characteristic and ρl is the nesting parameter along the lth
dimension. BRANDj is an indicator equal to one if j is a branded drug and zero
otherwise. The scaling parameter al is defined as
al 
1  ρl°L
l1p1  ρlq
.
The market share for product j in time t is the weighted average of the market
share from the two types. Assume high type consumers account for λt fraction of
the market in time t. The market share for product j in time t can be expressed as
sjt  λts
H
jt   p1  λtqsLjt. (1.7)
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1.4.2 Firm Behavior
Assume there are f  1, 2, ..., Ft firms in period t competing in a Bertrand-Nash
game. Firm f produces a subset of J products, Jf . The profit for firm f , omitting
the time subscript, is
Πf 
¸
jPJf
ppj mcjqMsjpp,AC,AD, ξ; θq  ADj  ACj, (1.8)
where sj is the market share of product j, mcj is the marginal cost of product j, and
M is the market size. ADj and ACj are the spending on advertising to consumers
and physicians, respectively. The marginal cost is assumed to be
logpmcjtq  ηj   gptq   hpτjtq   ωjt,
where ηj is the product fixed effect, gptq the function for time trend, hpτjtq the
function for time since entry, and ωj is the (time-varying) unobserved cost shocks.
Given the prices, product attributes, advertising spending and marginal costs,
firms simultaneously choose prices to maximize profits.20 The first order condition
with respect to price is given by
sj  
¸
kPJf
ppk mckq
Bsk
Bpj
 0. (1.9)
1.4.3 Copayments
The price faced by insured consumers is a small share of the full price. In the
United States, insurance plan enrollees may pay a fixed amount for each prescription
regardless of the drug cost (copayment), or a percent of the prescription drug cost
(coinsurance). The tier pricing system designed by insurance companies usually puts
20 I do not consider the decision on advertising in firms’ problem and assume that there is no
strategic interaction in advertising. In the counterfactuals later, I do not solve for new advertising
levels either.
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less expensive drugs in lower tiers and requires a smaller copayment or coinsurance
from enrollees. For example, a typical three-tier system has generics in tier one,
branded drugs without generic substitutes in tier two, and branded drugs with generic
substitutes in tier three. According to the 2011 Annual Survey by Kaiser Family
Foundation, 72% to 85% of covered workers have copays for drugs listed in the first
three tiers and 7% to 11% of covered workers have coinsurance.21
To have a model that nests copayment and coinsurance for an average consumer,
I assume
logppcjtq  γ0   γ1 logppjtq, (1.10)
where pcjt is the cost shared by the consumer for product j in period t and pjt is
the full price for product j in period t. The first term (γ0) is the fixed amount
and the second term γ1 logppjtq is the cost as a part of the full price. The model
thus incorporates the two types of cost-sharing systems. In addition, the log-log
model would be able to accommodate the fact that a high full price charged by drug
manufacturers would not be proportionally passed on to enrollees. The marginal
growth of their costs will be diminishing for γ1 P p0, 1q. Similarly, a very low full
price would not make enrollees’ out-of-pocket costs proportionally lower since they
are responsible for a basic payment for each prescription. As illustrated in Figure 1.5,
the log-log model predicts the copayment for consumers by pushing down a high full
price and moving up a low full price.
1.5 Estimation
The estimation of demand parameters closely follows Berry et al. (1995, 2004) and
Nevo (2000). I assume that the demand and pricing unobservables are mean inde-
pendent of a set of instruments at the true parameters. That is, E rξjpΘ0q | Zs 
21 http://kff.org/health-costs/report/employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-archives/
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E rωjpΘ0q | Zs  0. Using the contraction mapping suggested by BLP, I am able to
compute ξj given a set of parameter values and observed market shares:22
ξjt  δjtps, θq  x
1
jtβ  µj. (1.11)
The marginal cost is computed from the first order condition:
mc  p ∆pθ, δq1spθ, δq (1.12)
where ∆j,k  Bsk{BpjIj with Ij equal to one if j and k are produced by the same
firm. Then we can derive
ω  logpp ∆pθ, δq1spθ, δqq  η  g  hpτq. (1.13)
Estimation of the parameters is undertaken by the generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM). I minimize the objective function of Λ1ZWZ 1Λ, where W is the
weighting matrix. Let Zξ be the instruments for ξ and Zω be the instruments for ω.
The sample moments are (the time subscript are suppressed)
Z 1Λ 
 1
J
°
j Zξ,jξjpα, β
AC , βADq
1
J
°
j Zω,jωjpα, β
AC , βAD, ηjq

. (1.14)
The choice of instruments for price and advertising relies on the identifying as-
sumption used in Bresnahan (1987) and Berry et al. (1995). I assume the location of
each drug in product space is exogenous and a drug’s markup, which is a function of
prices and advertising levels, is correlated with its relative isolation in the product
space. Since I do not include product characteristics in the indirect utility, rather
than summing up the characteristics of own products and the other firms’ products
as in BLP, I follow Arcidiacono et al. (2013) and count the number of products in a
22 Because of the model specifications, the contraction mapping here is slightly modified and the
proof of invertibility is put in the appendix.
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category defined in various ways. Specifically, I use the number of molecules for the
same form, number of molecules of the same form in the same class, whether gener-
ics are present in the same form, whether generics are present in the same molecule,
number of generics present of the same molecule, number of generics present of the
same form, and number of generics present of the same form in the same class.23
I discuss identification in an intuitive way. Nesting parameters (ρl’s) are identified
from changes in aggregate market share for each nest when the number of products
in a nest varies. Take as an example the case of a nested logit model with molecules
as nests. If the nesting parameter is one, the model reduces to a simple logit model.
The market share would be roughly the same for each drug if they share similar
product characteristics. If the nesting parameter is zero, drugs of the same molecule
are perfect substitutes. Adding one drug to a molecule nest or changing the price of
a drug in a nest does not affect the market shares of drugs in the other nests.
Identification of the fraction of high type consumers (λ) relies on the first order
conditions with respect to prices on the supply side. If λ is zero, more competition
from generics will drive branded drugs’ prices down. If λ is one, there will be zero
market share for generics and branded drugs’ prices will not change as generics enter.
Thus, firms’ pricing decisions help to identify the fraction of high type consumers.
Once λ is identified, the price coefficients for each type (αH and αL) could be identi-
fied from variations in prices of both branded and generic drugs. Identification of the
linear parameters is more straightforward. Variations in advertising spending across
products and over time helps to identify their coefficients in the demand model.
23 The F-statistics based on usual standard errors from the first-stage regressions of endogenous
variables on the instruments range between 29 and 113, suggesting that the instruments are relevant.
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1.5.1 Results
Table 1.3 shows the results for copay estimation from 2003 to 2009. The estimates
for each year are the weighted average over plans based on the empirical distribution
of the number of plan enrollees. The estimates for the two parameters are similar
over the years. They are all significant at 5% level and the large sample size makes
the standard errors small. Those estimates are used to predict the copayments for
demand estimation and counterfactuals. For the years after 2009, I use the estimates
for 2009 to predict the copayments.
Table 1.4 presents the estimates and standard errors for nesting parameters and
the most important linear parameters in demand. Most estimates are statistically
significant at 5% level. The nonlinear parameter estimates reveal how consumers
substitute among the products. The estimated nesting parameter for molecule is
about 0.56 while the other nesting parameter estimates fall between 0.63 and 0.67.
This means that within-molecule substitution is the strongest, which is consistent
with the sudden changes in the market share of branded drugs when their generic
alternatives become avaiable. The estimate for the fraction of high type consumers
is about 14%. The price coefficient for high type consumers is estimated to be -
8.7, compared to -27.2 for low type consumers. Obviously, a non-trivial portion of
consumers has a strong preference for branded products and they care much less
about the drug copays than do low type consumers.
The large price coefficients do not mean that we should expect price elasticities to
be extremely large. Use of copay rather than full price in the demand model generates
larger price coefficients since copays are a small share of full price. According to
the copay estimates, one dollar increase in full price results in an average of $0.21
increase in branded copay and $0.26 increase in generic copay. This implies that
insurers would pass only one fourth of drug cost increase on to consumers and thus
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the price elasticities shown later would generally be small.
Linear parameter estimates show the effects of advertising and increasing con-
sumer awareness since a drug’s rollout. Recall that I include in the indirect utility
the logarithm of advertising spending. Therefore, in interpreting the estimates for
advertising parameters, we need to control for the advertising levels. The estimate
for logp1   ACq is larger than the estimate for logp1   ADq, which implies that,
at the same level of spending, DTCA is more effective than physician advertising
in this market. Moreover, the estimate for logp1   ADOT q is larger than the esti-
mate for logp1   ADq, and the estimate for logp1   ACOT q is also larger than the
estimate for logp1   ACq. The strong spillover effects of physician advertising and
DTCA are probably resulted from the small investment in advertising from branded
drugs after generic entry and the increase in generic market share at the same time.
The estimates for logp1   ADOT q and logp1   ACOT q capture generics’ large gain
from advertising by their branded rivals. In addition, the time-since-entry coefficient
estimates suggest on average it takes about two months for a new drug to get atten-
tion. The first two estimates for the time-since-entry dummies are not significant at
the 5% level. As a drug is on the market for more than two months, the effect of
time-since-entry gets stronger and more significant.
Table 1.5 shows the selected estimated cost parameters. The results include the
fixed effect estimates for major branded drugs and top-selling generic drugs. Also,
the table presents the estimated parameters on the dummies for one month, one
year and two years since entry. Other things being equal, branded atorvastatin,
rosuvastatin, and lovastatin have similar marginal costs to each other while branded
pravastatin has a higher marginal cost. Branded drugs’ marginal costs are 2.2 to 3.6
as large as those of their generic alternatives. Moreover, comparing the estimated
coefficients on the dummies for time since entry, I find that marginal cost is declining
quickly since a drug’s entry. This implies that drug production gets more efficient
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as a drug is on the market longer.
Table 1.6 contains price elasticities based on data for June 2006. At the end
of this month, the patent of simvastatin (Zocor) expires and generic simvastatin
start to enter. Table 1.7 summarizes the price elasticities for September 2006, three
months after generic simvastatins’ entry. The price elasticities for these two months
help to understand the results of counterfactuals, discussed in detail later, in which
Zocor aims to compete with generics using copay coupons. I discuss the results
for June 2006 first. The columns are the percentage change in market share in
response to one percent increase in the price of drugs in the rows. For example,
the market share of ezetimibe/simvastatin (tab) is predicted to increase by 0.20%
if amlodipine/atorvastatin (tab) raises price by 1%. Results for all branded drugs
and the top-selling generic drugs are reported. There are several interesting findings
from the table. First, all own price elasticities are larger than one in absolute value.
Under the assumption of profit maximization, an own price elasticity greater than
one in absolute value implies positive marginal revenue. If the own price elasticities
were less than one in absolute value, then the marginal revenue and the implied
marginal cost would be negative, which would make it difficult to construct a model
for the counterfactual analysis. Second, own price elasticities of generic pravastatin
and simvastatin are especially large. Recall that only low type consumers would
choose generics and they are more price sensitive than high type consumers. Thus,
a price change in generics would result in a larger change in their own market share.
A mix of high and low type consumers for branded drugs leads to a lower own price
elasticity.
Third, the cross price elasticities of drugs with similar characteristics are gen-
erally larger than the other cross price elasticities. For example, one percent price
decrease of branded simvastatin in tablet (Zocor) has the largest impact on generic
simvastatin, leading to a 3% decrease in share. Among branded drugs, those of the
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same form as Zocor are more affected in general. A one percent decrease in price of
Zocor would lower the share of lovastatin in tablet by 1.2% while the price change
only results in 0.3% decrease in the share of lovastatin in sustained-action tablet.
In addition, the substitution between branded simvastatin and generic simvas-
tatin is quite asymmetric. The price impact of branded simvastatin on generic simvas-
tatin is much larger than the impact of generic simvastatin on branded simvastatin.
This is primarily because the market share difference between branded simvastatin
and generic simvastatin is large when the generic just enter. In this month, branded
simvastatin has about 5% of market share while the generic simvastatin only ac-
counts for 0.26% of the market. The price change of branded simvastatin, therefore,
has a larger impact on the percentage change of the generic’s market share than the
other way around.
Finally, all results in Table 1.7 are similar to those of Table 1.6, except for the
elasticities with respect to the price changes of branded simvastatin. In September
2006, the market share of branded simvastatin decreases to 0.93% as generic sim-
vastatins take over its market. The changes in the market share of generics given a
price change of branded simvastatin are almost zero since most of the consumers of
branded simvastatins in this month probably have a strong preference for branded
drugs and they would not switch to generics. This implies that the price changes by
branded simvastatin would affect the other branded drugs more than the generics
when generic simvastatins are popular.
1.6 Counterfactual Analysis
Using the estimates for demand and supply parameters, I construct counterfactuals
to explore the effects of copay coupons on social welfare. I assume that Merck,
the manufacturer of branded simvastatin (Zocor), decides to issue copay coupons to
consumers when its patent expires. I choose Zocor as the issuer of copay coupons for
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two reasons. First, I observe the entry of generic simvastatins in the data and from
estimation results I learn how consumers switch to those generics from the other
drugs. Second, Zocor is the best-selling branded drug before Lipitor. Understanding
the outcomes of Zocor’s copay coupon program would shed some light on the welfare
impacts of Lipitor’s coupon program. It is thus interesting to experiment with Zocor
to study the welfare implications of the new pricing tactic.
There are some simplifying assumptions that facilitate the counterfactuals. The
fraction of consumers receiving copay coupons is assumed to be exogenous since
the manufacturer could not fully control how many consumers actually receive the
coupons. Also, the insurance copay is still determined by the copayment model.
Given a full price, insurers would charge consumers a share of drug costs using the
estimated copay formula and they would not change the formula. Furthermore, I only
consider the effects of issuing coupons during the first five months (July 2006 to Nov
2006) after Zocor’s patent expires. During this period, there are three manufacturers
for generic simvastatins: Teva, Ranbaxy, and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories. Teva and
Ranbaxy are the first challengers of Zocor’s primary U.S. patent and were granted
180-day exclusivity by FDA to sell generic simvastatins. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories
received a license from Zocor to sell authorized generic simvastatins.24 No other firms
are allowed to enter the market of simvastatins during these five months.25 There are
two main reasons to restrict the experiment to the 180-day exclusivity period. First,
with limited generic competition, branded drug manufacturers have more incentive
to use copay coupons than when generic competition is severe. Once there are many
generics in the market, generic prices are usually very low and the coupons would
24 According the FTC report on authorized generics, outside licensees’ pricing decisions are typically
independent of the branded drug manufacturers. Thus, I treat Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories as a
competitor to Merck rather than a partner.
25 In late December 2006, other generics started to enter the market and thus I exclude this month
in the policy simulation.
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not be as attractive to consumers. Second, the lack of a model for entry makes it
difficult to tackle the possible generic entrants after the exclusivity period.
Suppose there are Jt drugs in period t and the fraction of consumers receiving a co-
pay coupon from Zocor is q P p0, 1q, firms compete in a Bertrand game and maximize
their own profits, under the full information assumption, by simultaneously choos-
ing their full prices (p1, p2, ..., pJt) and, for Zocor, the copay with a coupon (p˜cZ).26
Insurers decide the insurance copay for each drug (pc1, pc2, ..., pcJt) using the copay
formula. Consumers with a copay coupon face copays rpc1, pc2, ...,mintpcZ , p˜cZu, ..., pcJts
and consumers without a copay coupon face copays rpc1, pc2, ..., pcZ , ..., pcJts. Note that a
consumer with a copay coupon from Zocor will compare the copay using the coupon
with the insurance copay. If the copay from coupon is higher than the insurance
copay for Zocor, the consumer will not use the coupon at all.
With the equilibrium prices, I can calculate the change in firm profits, consumer
welfare and insurer’s spending. The profit from Zocor in period t with copay coupons
is
piZ Mt

p1  qq ppZt mcZtq sNCZt   q ppZt  pcZt   mintp˜cZt, pcZtu mcZtq sCZt

 ADZt  ACZt,
where sNCZt is Zocor’s share from those without a coupon and sCZt the share from those
with a coupon. The revenue from those with a coupon is insurer’s payment (pZtpcZt)
plus the minimum of copay using a coupon and insurance copay (mintp˜cZt, pcZtu).
Under the GEV error structure, the expected consumer surplus in period t, measured
in dollars, before copay coupons are used can be expressed as
E pCS0tq Mt

λ

1
αH


logpGHt q   p1  λq

1
αL


logpGLt q   CE

, (1.15)
26 In this case, choosing the copay for coupon users (p˜cZ) is equivalent to choosing the coupon value
(pcZ  p˜cZ) since, given pZ , pcZ is decided according to the copay formula and the formula is fixed
throughout the game.
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where CE is the Euler’s constant. The expected consumer surplus in period t, mea-
sured in dollars, after copay coupons are used is
E pCS1tq Mt

λ

1
αH


q logpGH,Ct q   p1  qq logpGH,NCt q
	
 
p1  λq

1
αL


q logpGL,Ct q   p1  qq logpGL,NCqt
	
  CE

, (1.16)
where GH,Ct and GH,NCt are the G function values from high type consumers with
and without a copay coupon, respectively. GL,Ct and GL,NCt are the G function values
from low type consumers with and without a copay coupon, respectively. The change
in the expected consumer surplus in period t is
∆EpCStq  E pCS1tq  E pCS0tq . (1.17)
The Euler’s constants in E pCS1tq and E pCS0tq simply cancel out.
An additional assumption needs to be made to solve for equilibrium prices. The-
oretically, Zocor would set pZ  8 and p˜cZ  0 for any q ¡ 0. This way, Zocor can
concentrate on the consumers with copay coupons and receive an infinite payment
from the insurance companies for each of these consumers. Figure 1.6 illustrates
how Merck’s profit changes with Zocor’s full price when q  0.05, holding fixed the
other prices and the copay with coupon. The profit from those who do not have a
coupon reaches a maximum at the price of 2.4 while the profit from coupon users is
strictly increasing in the full price of Zocor. Merck’s total profit is always increasing
in the full price of Zocor since the profit increase from coupon users is larger than
the profit decrease from coupon nonusers beyond the price of 2.4. To limit the equi-
librium prices to a reasonable level, I set an upper bound for Zocor’s price equal to
1.25 times the current Zocor’s price. Beyond that point, I assume that the insurer
will remove the drug from its prescription drug list. The choice of the upper bound
is based on the fact that Lipitor’s real price increased by about 23.8% over the two
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years since its coupon program was introduced in late 2010.27 The price increase by
Lipior has led some insurers and pharmacy benefit managers to exclude Lipitor from
their prescription drug lists.28
I consider two counterfactuals: (1) consumers who receive copay coupons and
those who do not are equally price sensitive, and (2) consumers who receive copay
coupons are all low type (on average, they are more price sensitive than those who
do not receive coupons). In counterfactual 1, Merck cannot price discriminate based
on price sensitivities since the composition of coupon users and nonusers is the same.
Thus, the results from counterfactual 1 are all driven by the agency problem between
insurers and patients. In counterfactual 2, I allow Merck to target coupons to the
most price-sensitive individuals to understand how coupon targeting and the agency
issue together change the effects of coupons on welfare.
Within the two counterfactuals, I consider a case with no price response and a
case with price response. In the case with no price response, Merck sets the copay
for coupon users to maximize its profit, holding all prices (including Zocor’s price)
fixed. In the other case, firms are allowed to respond by choosing prices to re-
optimize profits. Comparing the results from the two cases could show how strategic
interaction affects social welfare when copay coupons are introduced. In addition,
I solve for equilibrium prices in each counterfactual for different degrees of coupon
penetration to learn how expanding the coupon program affects welfare and profits.
1.6.1 Counterfactual 1: Baseline
Table 1.8 shows that Merck sets the copay for coupon users equal to less than half
the insurance copay for Zocor when all full prices are fixed. The copay with coupons
27 “Rx Price Watch Case Study: Efforts to Reduce the Impact of Generic Competition for Lipitor,”
American Association of Retired Persons, June 2013.
28 For example, starting on January 1, 2013, UnitedHealthcare stops offering Lipitor to its plan
enrollees because of Lipitor’s high price and extensive use of copay coupons.
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is also lower than the average insurance copay for generic simvastatins and close to
the average insurance copay for the other generics. This results in an increase in
Zocor’s market share by more than three times when there are only 5% of consumers
receiving copay coupons. As the fraction of consumers with a coupon increases to
50%, Zocor’s market share becomes 37 times as large as its original level. The other
drugs’ combined market share drops by about 10 percentage points (40%). These
show that Merck wants to aggressively lower the copay for coupon users to expand
Zocor’s market share.
The low copay set by Merck has a large impact on firm profits and insurance
payments. Table 1.9 shows that consumers benefit from copay coupons because
some of them could buy Zocor at a low price and those without coupons face the
same price as before. Merck’s profit from Zocor increases by 12 million dollars when
only 5% of consumers receive coupons. The small fraction of consumers who get
a coupon more than doubles Merck’s profits from Zocor. At the same time, the
other drugs’ profits drop by about 5% and insurance spending grows by 15%. The
net effect of the coupon program is negative mainly because of the large increase
in insurance payment. The net effects of copay coupons on social welfare get more
negative as the coupon program expands.
When firms are allowed to change prices in response to introduction of coupons,
Merck would set a very low copay for coupon users and raise the full price of Zocor
as high as possible. This way, Merck is able to attract most of the consumers with a
coupon and earn a large profit from the insurer. Table 1.10 shows that all full prices
of Zocor hit the upper bound (1.25 times the original price) and the copay for coupon
users is lower than any insurance copay in the market. The pricing strategy implies
that Merck views the market with coupons as its main source of profits. The low
copays for coupon users make Zocor’s market shares larger at any level of coupon
penetration than its corresponding market shares under no price response.
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On the other hand, the average equilibrium price of the other branded drugs
becomes higher after coupons are introduced because Zocor’s high prices mitigate
price competition in the market. As coupon penetration rate increases, the average
branded drug prices slightly go up. This is the result of different pricing strategies
played by Merck and the other firms. As coupons become more popular, Merck sets
a higher price for their branded drugs to make the coupons more attractive. Doing
so would sacrifice some market share from those without a coupon. But given the
large profits from Zocor’s coupons, it is optimal to raise prices of the other branded
products owned by Merck to increase Zocor’s market share. The other firms, however,
would want to cut the prices of their branded products to compete for coupon users
as Zocor’s coupon program gets larger. Obviously, the effect of higher prices set by
Merck dominates the effect of lower prices set by the other drug manufacturers when
the fraction of consumers with a coupon is less than or equal to 50%. When coupon
penetration rates are larger than 55% (not shown in the table), the average branded
prices start to drop since the higher prices of Merck’s products make their market
share smaller and this reduces their weights in the average price.
Table 1.11 shows that the coupon program increases consumer welfare, Zocor’s
profit, and insurer spending more than it does in the no-response case. The larger
increase in consumer welfare comes from the lower copay for coupon users and the
larger overall market share. Merck further improves its profits from Zocor by issuing
coupons since they are able to raise the full prices in the price-response case. The
gains of Merck and consumers come at the cost of insurance payments. The increase
in insurer spending in the price-response case is 70% more than the increase in the
no-response case. Insurance payments increase by 25% when 5% of consumers get a
coupon and by 50% when the coupon penetration rate is 10%. In addition, when 5%
of consumers receive coupons, the other branded drugs have a higher combined profit
than before coupons are introduced. As coupons become more popular, change in
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the profits of the other branded drugs turns negative but the effects of coupons on
the other branded drugs’ profits are weaker than in the no-response case. When the
coupon penetration is low, the high price of Zocor mitigates price competition among
branded drugs in the market of those who do not have a coupon, which lessens the
negative impacts of copay coupons on the profits from the other branded drugs.
The results from counterfactual 1 show that coupons benefit the issuer by taking
advantage of the agency problem between insurers and patients. Copay coupons can
help the issuer to induce consumers to buy its product by reducing their copays and
earn a large profit from insurance companies. In most cases, the other firms are hurt
by the coupon program because of a smaller market share. In the case with price
response, insurer spending increases by 25% when only 5% of consumers receive a
coupon. The net effect of copay coupons on social welfare is negative because the
increase in insurance payments is always more than the gains of consumers and the
coupon issuer.
1.6.2 Counterfactual 2: Coupon Targeting
In counterfactual 2, I assume Merck has the ability to direct coupons to the most
price-sensitive types of consumers. Thus, all consumers who receive a coupon are
assumed to be low type. Most of the results from counterfactual 2 are consistent with
those of counterfactual 1. Thus, I focus on the major differences between the results
in the counterfactuals and discuss how the ability to target coupons contributes to
the differences.
First, in the no-response case of counterfactual 2, the copay for coupon users is
slightly lower than in the no-response case of counterfactual 1. Table 1.12 shows
that the copay is set to be $7.45, compared with $7.57 in counterfactual 1. Because
now the coupon users are more price sensitive, the optimal copay for them becomes
lower. Second, we learn from Table 1.13 that the increase in Merck’s profits from
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Zocor is larger than in counterfactual 1 and the decrease in the other branded drugs’
profits is much smaller. In contrast, the loss in generics’ profits becomes larger.
In counterfactual 2, there are more high type consumers among those without a
coupon, for a given coupon penetration rate, than in counterfactual 1. Since they
only consider branded drugs, branded drugs’ market shares and profits are higher
than those of counterfactual 1. Also, generics are hurt more in counterfactual 2
because of a higher proportion of high-type consumers without a coupon who do not
choose generics at all.
Third, Table 1.14 shows that Zocor’s prices hit the upper bound again in the
price-response case. The equilibrium copay for coupon users is slightly lower than
the copay value in the price-response case in counterfactual 1 since in counterfactual
2 the coupon users are more price sensitive. Also, the other branded drugs’ average
optimal prices are higher than those in the price-response case of counterfactual 1.
Since the other branded drug manufacturers know that those without a coupon are
on average less price sensitive than those with a coupon, it is optimal for them to
charge a higher full price to capture the consumers without coupons. It is interesting
that the average optimal prices of the other branded drugs get higher as more and
more low-type consumers have a coupon. This pricing pattern suggests that Merck’s
ability to target coupons to more price-sensitive consumers makes branded drug
manufacturers care more about the consumers without coupons and exploit their
lower price sensitivity by raising full prices.
Additionally, Table 1.15 shows that changes in the profits of the other branded
drugs are all positive and the increase in the profits gets larger as more low-type
consumers have a coupon. When coupons are introduced and targeted to low-type
consumers, branded drug manufacturers are able to set a higher price and earn a
larger profit than when coupons are randomly distributed. Zocor’s targeting coupons
to low-type consumers raises the proportion of high-type in the consumers without
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a coupon, which are the main source of profits for the other branded drugs. Thus,
the average price sensitivity of consumers without a coupon is lower than in counter-
factual 1 and this lets branded drug manufacturers set a higher price and earn more
in counterfactual 2. The profits from Zocor are also larger than in counterfactual
1 because the difference between Zocor’s price and the price of the other branded
drugs narrows, which leads to a larger market share of Zocor in the consumers with-
out coupons. Finally, consumer welfare gains do not change much compared to the
gains in the price-response case in counterfactual 1. The effects of lower copay for
coupon users and higher prices for coupon nonusers roughly cancel each other out.
To sum up, Zocor’s coupon targeting helps screen consumers and lowers the
average price sensitivity of those without a coupon. This further mitigates price
competition among branded drugs and benefits not only Merck but the other branded
drug manufacturers as well.
1.7 Conclusion
To understand the welfare implications of copay coupons, I estimate a model with
consumer heterogeneity and rich substitution patterns and demonstrate the effects
of copay coupons on the healthcare system in the counterfactuals. I consider two
motivations to use copay coupons: the agency problem and coupon targeting. First, I
find that the agency problem between insurers and patients can make copay coupons
highly profitable. Copay coupons benefit the coupon issuer and consumers at the
cost of larger insurance payments. The other firms are hurt in most cases since they
could hardly compete for the consumers with a coupon. Second, when I allow for
coupon targeting, the coupon benefits for the coupon issuer become larger because
targeting enables coupons to screen consumers and mitigate price competition among
branded drugs. In this case, most of the branded drug manufacturers also gain from
the introduction of copay coupons.
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There are several interesting extensions for the study of copay coupons in phar-
maceuticals. First, copay coupons can be used for competition between branded
drugs. In the paper, I only consider the case with a single coupon issuer after its
patent expires. Competition using coupons when there are no generics available can
expand the overall market and have different welfare implications. Second, solving for
advertising spending with the introduction of coupons can improve the welfare anal-
ysis. Usually, branded drugs cut advertising spending after generics enter because
of generics’ free-riding problem. With copay coupons, branded drug manufacturers
may have a stronger incentive to advertise since they would want to attract more
coupon users. If advertising is valuable to consumers, the gain in consumer welfare
from coupons could be larger with more advertising.
Finally, in addition to the agency problem and price discrimination, dynamics
could motivate branded drug manufacturers to use copay coupons. For example, they
may use coupons to build brand loyalty and help patients stay on their medicines
after they stop offering coupons. Also, copay coupons could be used to deter generic
entry since the low copay with coupons makes it very difficult for generics to compete
with branded drugs. Incorporating these dynamic motivations would complement the
static analysis in the paper and provide more insights on the welfare implications of
copay coupons.
34
Table 1.1: Statins and Statin Combinations
Class Molecule Brand Name Form
Brand
Entry
1st Generic
Entry
Max Num
Generics
Statins
atorvastatin Lipitor TAB Jan 1997 - -
fluvastatin Lescol CAP Apr 1994 - -
fluvastatin Lescol XL SA TAB Nov 2000 - -
lovastatin Altoprev SA TAB Jul 2002 - -
lovastatin Mevacor TAB Sep 1987 Feb 2002 11
pravastatin Pravachol TAB Nov 1991 May 2006 14
rosuvastatin Crestor TAB Aug 2003 -
simvastatin Zocor TAB Jan 1992 Jun 2006 16
Statin
Combinations
amlodipine/atorvastatin Caduet TAB Mar 2004 - -
ezetimibe/simvastatin Vytorin TAB Jul 2004 - -
lovastatin/niacin Advicor SA TAB Dec 2001 - -
niacin/simvastatin Simcor SA TAB Feb 2008 - -
Table 1.2: Price, Market Share, and Advertising Spending
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full sample
Price 3638 1.0642 1.0127 0.0378 5.0874
Share 3638 0.0082 0.0169 0.0000 0.0948
Physician ad 3638 1,544,225 4,112,393 0 30,083,698
DTCA 3638 709,144 2,894,856 0 31,339,548
Branded without generic equivalent
Price 812 2.3090 0.7267 0.9864 5.0874
Share 812 0.0198 0.0267 0.0000 0.0948
Physician ad 812 6,741,131 6,380,512 0 30,083,698
DTCA 812 3,176,964 5,452,706 0 31,339,548
Branded with generic equivalent
Price 335 2.2223 0.8930 0.6456 4.3290
Share 335 0.0010 0.0031 0.0000 0.0499
Physician ad 335 415,167 791,388 0 3,602,323
DTCA 335 510 3,001 0 31,741
Generics
Price 2491 0.5027 0.4668 0.0378 4.5666
Share 2491 0.0053 0.0113 0.0000 0.0790
Physician ad 2491 2,012 11,220 0 99,532
DTCA 2491 0 0 0 0
Note: Observation is at the month-molecule-branded-form-firm level.
35
Table 1.3: Copay Estimates
γ0 γ1
Year Est S.E. Est S.E. Plans Total Rx
2003 1.2393 0.0062 0.8290 0.0101 68 216920
2004 1.2981 0.0047 0.8901 0.0086 64 129140
2005 1.2407 0.0082 0.9064 0.0090 230 92820
2006 1.4343 0.0141 0.9469 0.0146 295 155230
2007 1.2624 0.0076 0.8469 0.0062 205 1431612
2008 1.3486 0.0118 0.8682 0.0056 104 739917
2009 1.3315 0.0182 0.8448 0.0058 204 165248
Note: Parameters are weighted OLS estimates with clustered
standard errors by enrollee. Sample includes only prescriptions
with 30-day supply and insurance plans with more than 10
thousand enrollees.
Table 1.4: Demand Parameters
Est S.E.
Nonlinear parameters:
Nesting Parameters
Class 0.6544 0.1995
Branded/generic 0.6323 0.2038
Molecule 0.5597 0.1255
Form 0.6650 0.0884
Proportion of high type (λ) 0.1426 0.0072
αH 8.6783 1.5405
αL 27.2243 0.9199
Linear parameters (selected):
βAD 0.1352 0.0478
βAC 0.6078 0.0395
βADOT 0.3101 0.0530
βACOT 0.8623 0.2269
1m since entry 1.7625 2.2204
2m since entry 2.6343 1.9586
3m since entry 4.5392 2.2644
4m since entry 3.7120 1.9795
5m since entry 3.7589 1.9378
6m since entry 2.9701 1.7709
Note: N = 3638. Parameters are GMM estimates with
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
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Table 1.5: Selected Cost Parameters
Est. S.E.
Atorvastatin (branded) 1.5261 0.1237
Rosuvastatin (branded) 1.4986 0.1243
Simvastatin (branded) 1.8890 0.1237
Simvastatin (generic) 0.2456 0.1352
Lovastatin (branded) 1.4960 0.1237
Lovastatin (generic) 0.2272 0.1457
Pravastatin (branded) 3.1775 0.1237
Pravastatin (generic) 0.5710 0.1347
One month since entry 1.3846 0.2588
One year since entry 0.3548 0.1546
Two years since entry 0.1745 0.1375
Note: N = 3638. The unit is dollar per patient-day.
Adjusted R-squared = 0.71. Parameters are GMM estimates
with homoskedasticity-only standard errors.
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Table 1.8: Simulated Price, Copay, and Market Share (Counterfactual 1, No Re-
sponse)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
0% 5% 10% 30% 50%
Average price for one month supply
Branded simvastatin 76.81 76.81 76.81 76.81 76.81
Generic simvastatin 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.42
Other branded 65.43 65.44 65.45 65.47 65.51
Other generic 31.85 31.86 31.88 31.97 32.11
Average copay for one month supply
Copay from coupon 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57
Branded simvastatin 17.40 17.40 17.40 17.40 17.40
Generic simvastatin 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.53
Other branded 14.94 14.94 14.94 14.95 14.96
Other generic 7.41 7.42 7.42 7.44 7.47
Market share
Branded simvastatin 0.0103 0.0467 0.0830 0.2285 0.3740
Generic simvastatin 0.0519 0.0496 0.0472 0.0378 0.0285
Other branded 0.1584 0.1525 0.1466 0.1229 0.0993
Other generic 0.0374 0.0359 0.0344 0.0283 0.0222
Table 1.9: Change in Welfare, Profits, and Spending (Counterfactual 1, No Response)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
Change in Original level 5% 10% 30% 50%
Consumer welfare 194,662,532 6,356,325 12,712,650 38,137,951 63,563,251
Profits: branded simvastatin 11,201,575 12,357,245 24,714,491 74,143,472 123,572,454
Profits: generic simvastatin 14,316,579 -646,221 -1,292,442 -3,877,325 -6,462,209
Profits: other branded 272,917,089 -10,194,671 -20,389,343 -61,168,028 -101,946,713
Profits: other generic 9,289,489 -376,039 -752,078 -2,256,233 -3,760,388
Insurer spending 875,612,979 129,256,873 258,513,746 775,541,237 1,292,568,728
40
Table 1.10: Simulated Price, Copay, and Market Share (Counterfactual 1, Price
Response)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
0% 5% 10% 30% 50%
Average price for one month supply
Branded simvastatin 76.81 96.01 96.01 95.99 96.01
Generic simvastatin 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.42
Other branded 65.43 67.18 67.58 69.40 71.62
Other generic 31.85 31.81 31.82 31.81 31.88
Average copay for one month supply
Copay from coupon 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76
Branded simvastatin 17.40 21.50 21.50 21.50 21.50
Generic simvastatin 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.53
Other branded 14.94 15.32 15.40 15.80 16.28
Other generic 7.41 7.40 7.41 7.40 7.42
Market share
Branded simvastatin 0.0103 0.0491 0.0952 0.2800 0.4653
Generic simvastatin 0.0519 0.0496 0.0472 0.0373 0.0272
Other branded 0.1584 0.1547 0.1462 0.1131 0.0827
Other generic 0.0374 0.0358 0.0341 0.0272 0.0201
Table 1.11: Change in Welfare, Profits, and Spending (Counterfactual 1, Price Re-
sponse)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
Change in Original level 5% 10% 30% 50%
Consumer welfare 194,662,532 6,784,959 18,931,200 67,617,547 116,405,789
Profits: branded simvastatin 11,201,575 58,045,503 119,951,619 367,570,401 616,423,199
Profits: generic simvastatin 14,316,579 -606,152 -1,275,920 -3,990,257 -6,797,782
Profits: other branded 272,917,089 10,681,565 -1,328,374 -49,823,252 -98,777,783
Profits: other generic 9,289,489 -382,607 -806,373 -2,523,202 -4,300,805
Insurer spending 875,612,979 219,759,515 436,442,418 1,305,670,449 2,183,617,216
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Table 1.12: Simulated Price, Copay, and Market Share (Counterfactual 2, No Re-
sponse)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
0% 5% 10% 30% 50%
Average price for one month supply
Branded simvastatin 76.81 76.81 76.81 76.81 76.81
Generic simvastatin 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.41
Other branded 65.43 65.60 65.76 66.44 67.17
Other generic 31.85 31.86 31.88 31.99 32.18
Average copay for one month supply
Copay from coupon 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45
Branded simvastatin 17.40 17.40 17.40 17.40 17.40
Generic simvastatin 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.53
Other branded 14.94 14.97 15.01 15.16 15.32
Other generic 7.41 7.42 7.42 7.44 7.49
Market share
Branded simvastatin 0.0103 0.0481 0.0858 0.2369 0.3880
Generic simvastatin 0.0519 0.0491 0.0464 0.0353 0.0243
Other branded 0.1584 0.1571 0.1558 0.1506 0.1454
Other generic 0.0374 0.0356 0.0338 0.0266 0.0194
Table 1.13: Change in Welfare, Profits, and Spending (Counterfactual 2, No Re-
sponse)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
Change in Original level 5% 10% 30% 50%
Consumer welfare 194,662,532 6,683,085 13,366,170 40,098,510 66,830,850
Profits: branded simvastatin 11,201,575 12,895,452 25,790,905 77,372,715 128,954,524
Profits: generic simvastatin 14,316,579 -761,178 -1,522,355 -4,567,066 -7,611,776
Profits: other branded 272,917,089 -748,909 -1,497,818 -4,493,453 -7,489,089
Profits: other generic 9,289,489 -447,007 -894,014 -2,682,042 -4,470,070
Insurer spending 875,612,979 152,541,838 305,083,676 915,251,026 1,525,418,377
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Table 1.14: Simulated Price, Copay, and Market Share (Counterfactual 2, Price
Response)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
0% 5% 10% 30% 50%
Average price for one month supply
Branded simvastatin 76.81 95.98 95.98 96.00 96.00
Generic simvastatin 54.43 54.43 54.43 54.42 54.42
Other branded 65.43 67.41 68.06 70.63 72.81
Other generic 31.85 31.82 31.82 31.84 31.88
Average copay for one month supply
Copay from coupon 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72
Branded simvastatin 17.40 21.49 21.49 21.50 21.50
Generic simvastatin 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.54 12.54
Other branded 14.94 15.36 15.50 16.06 16.54
Other generic 7.41 7.41 7.41 7.41 7.42
Market share
Branded simvastatin 0.0103 0.0499 0.0968 0.2847 0.4726
Generic simvastatin 0.0519 0.0492 0.0464 0.0347 0.0228
Other branded 0.1584 0.1605 0.1576 0.1483 0.1425
Other generic 0.0374 0.0356 0.0336 0.0254 0.0170
Table 1.15: Change in Welfare, Profits, and Spending (Counterfactual 2, Price Re-
sponse)
Fraction of consumers with copay coupons
Change in Original level 5% 10% 30% 50%
Consumer welfare 194,662,532 6,659,462 18,609,664 66,841,642 116,015,374
Profits: branded simvastatin 11,201,575 59,100,286 122,071,821 374,466,147 626,872,638
Profits: generic simvastatin 14,316,579 -727,714 -1,514,159 -4,720,815 -8,022,187
Profits: other branded 272,917,089 23,454,134 24,671,679 30,853,786 38,207,213
Profits: other generic 9,289,489 -460,303 -958,067 -2,988,045 -5,078,644
Insurer spending 875,612,979 246,868,593 490,774,719 1,472,669,756 2,462,710,258
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Figure 1.1: Sales (Patient-Days)
Figure 1.2: Price per Patient-Day
44
Figure 1.3: Spending on Advertising to Physicians
Figure 1.4: Spending on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
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Figure 1.5: Example: Relationship between Full Price and Copay
Figure 1.6: Example: Profit of Merck vs. Zocor’s Full Price
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2Brand Loyalty and Learning in Pharmaceutical
Demand
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, branded drug manufacturers are facing generic competition with
many of their blockbuster drugs. According to IMS Health, the patents of six of the
ten best-selling prescription drugs in the US expired in 2011 and 2012. To retain
revenue after patent expiration, branded drug manufacturers have employed several
strategies, including pay-for-delay agreements (paying generic companies not to bring
lower-cost alternatives to market) and copay coupons (distributing a card directly to
patients to lower their out-of-pocket costs). The success of these strategies depends
not only on how many patients drug manufacturers can attract today, but also on
how many of the patients will stick to the brands tomorrow. Thus, patient stickiness
plays an important role in these marketing strategies and understanding the sources
of patient stickiness in pharmaceuticals can help manage the programs.
This paper estimates the demand for pharmaceuticals by incorporating brand
loyalty and learning to study patient stickiness. Using the micro-level databases for
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cholesterol-lowering drugs, I look at the switch patterns of patients with different
lengths of treatment. The data shows inter-molecule switching probabilities are
higher in early prescriptions and quickly decrease in a treatment, suggesting the
existence of switching costs and learning about molecules. Switching costs make a
patient loyal to a drug and lower the probability of choosing a different drug next
time.1 On the other hand, patients learn the effects of drugs by taking it repeatedly
and will probably stop experimenting once they find a drug that works well.
I disentangle the two effects in a multinomial logit model and estimate the effects
using patients’ prescription history. The estimates suggest high switching costs and
strong learning effects at the molecule level in the cholesterol lowering drug market.
Inter-molecule switching costs are larger than intra-molecule switching costs. The
effect of learning about molecules gets larger as a patient takes a drug longer. In
addition, switching costs largely raise the probability of choosing the same drug for
new patients. Both learning and switching costs contribute to experienced patients’
stickiness in the long run.
The paper adds to the literature on consumer dynamics in pharmaceuticals by ex-
ploiting the rich micro-level data and identifying effects of brand loyalty and learning.
Coscelli (2000) uses a prescription level dataset from the Italian markets to study
the relationship between probabilities of switching brands and patient and doctor at-
tributes. He shows habit persistence of doctors and patients in prescription choices.
Crawford and Shum (2005) use the same dataset to study inter-molecule choice by
considering consumer learning and patient heterogeneity. However, the lack of price
variation in Italian markets makes it impossible to identify the switching cost in
their structural analysis. My datasets from the US pharmaceutical markets can
overcome this problem since drug manufacturers are allowed to compete in price in
1 In the paper, I use “switching cost” and “loyalty” interchangeably. Klemperer (1995) argues
that brand loyalty can create switching costs. Studying the actual sources of switching costs in
pharmaceuticals is beyond the scope of this paper.
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US. Moreover, my datasets have information on insurance plan design and this re-
veals variation in out-of-pocket costs for drugs with different status in an insurance
plan. The price faced by a patient is her cost share rather than the full price. With
the information on out-of-pocket costs, I can more adequately estimate the price
elasticities.
Dalen et al. (2011) and Lundin (2000) estimate binary choice models based on
prescription level data with price information. They find price difference between
branded drugs and generics an important factor in generic substitution. Both have
limitations on the use of patients’ prescription history. Dalen et al. (2011) ignores
past use and Lundin (2000) only considers switching cost by including the last pre-
scription for each observation in the demand model. My paper takes into account
both switching costs, which incur when patient chooses a drug different than the
choice last time, and learning, which is revealed in the choice of the same drugs
multiple times. Furthermore, I consider learning at the molecule level and the ver-
sion (branded/generic) level. Incorporating learning about the generic version of a
molecule in the demand model can help understand intra-molecule switching after
patent expiration.
Finally, the paper also contributes to the empirical study of consumer brand
loyalty in the marketing literature. Past studies in this field (Krishnamurthi and
Raj, 1991; Erdem, 1996; Allenby and Lenk, 1995; Keane, 1997; Dubé et al., 2010;
Osborne, 2011; Bronnenberg et al., 2012) focus on brand loyalty and state dependence
in consumer goods. My paper looks at pharmaceuticals, which have more than 300
billion US dollar sales in a year. Consumer dynamics in this industry can be of
interest to managers and policy makers. For example, drug manufacturers may
want to know how large switching costs are for patients to try a drug when they
are marketing a new product. Policy makers may be interested in the learning
process in a treatment, which can provide directions to improve patient compliance
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or medication adherence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes data and
presents relevant statistics and trends. Section 2.3 develops models for demand.
Section 2.4 discusses estimation strategies and results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
The data are obtained from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters
Database and the MarketScan Benefit Plan Design Database through National Bu-
reau of Economic Research (NBER). The MarketScan Databases are constructed
from privately insured paid medical and prescription drug claims. There are about
100 payers and more than 500 million claim records in the Databases. The Commer-
cial Claims and Encounters Database provides the prescription-level data on date
of service, drug characteristics, days of supply, full price, out-of-pocket cost, patient
age, and patient gender. The “plan key” variable in the data can be used to link the
Commercial Claims and Encounters Database to the Benefit Plan Design Database,
which provides the health insurance information for the patient, including copayment
and coinsurance for drugs in different tiers.
My work focuses on the market of cholesterol-lowering drugs (statins) from 2005
to 2006. There are several reasons to analyze the market for the years. First,
cholesterol-lowering drug is the largest therapeutic class in the US by spending in
2006 and had approximately 22 billion US dollar sales and 210 million prescriptions in
the year.2 Cholesterol-lowering drugs can help lower rates of low-density lipoprotein
(LDL) cholesterol in the blood and are usually used repeatedly, which gives the
opportunity to observe the choices a patient made for several periods. This enables
me to examine the dynamic aspect of pharmaceutical demand. Second, one of the
best-selling drugs in this class, Zocor, lost its patent protection in mid 2006. With
2 The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2010, IMS Institute.
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generic entry after patent expiration, I am able to see how patients respond to the
availability of low-cost alternatives. Third, the drug manufacturer Pfizer employed
aggressive strategies in this market, including pay-for-delay agreements and copay
coupons, to retain revenue from Lipitor after its patent expiration in 2011. Thus,
understanding consumer switch between branded drugs and generics in this market
can shed light on the possible outcomes of Pfizer’s strategies.
I take three major steps to prepare the data to be used in this paper. First, I
keep individuals who have at least one prescription recorded in both 2005 and 2006
to make sure the individuals in the sample are enrolled in both years. Second, I
do not observe when a patient started to take drugs. To avoid difficulty associated
with the left-censoring, I include only patients with their first prescriptions observed
after June 30, 2005. By doing so, I assume that patients who haven’t took drugs
for more than half a year are new in the market.3 Third, since I only observe the
out-of-pocket cost for the drug purchased, I calculate the out-of-pocket costs for all
available drugs faced by a patient by taking the average out-of-pocket cost for each
drug across prescriptions belonging to the patient’s insurance plan. For some small
insurance plans, there are no prescriptions for certain drugs and thus the average
out-of-pocket costs for those drugs in the plan are not available. I drop patients in
the plans with missing out-of-pocket costs. The filters together left me with 18,316
patients and 121,033 prescriptions.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics. There are six molecules with a market
share greater than 3% and two of them have generic equivalents. Generic simvastatin
entered in mid 2006 and it is the only new choice in the sample. The average full
price for a 30-day supply for branded drugs fall between $78 and $118, while the
3 In the sample, prescriptions with more than six months of supply are rare. Thus, based on the
definition of a new patient, the cleaned data mostly covers individuals who entered this market for
the first time ever and those who had not used drugs in this therapeutic class for a long time. The
latter type of patients is assumed not to retain information on anything which happened before.
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average full price for generic lovastatin is only $21.4. The price for generic simvas-
tatin is quite high since there was limited competition among generic manufacturers
during the first few months of Zocor’s patent expiration.4 The out-of-pocket costs
are the net payments from patients and they are about 22% to 30% the full price
of branded drugs. For the generics, the out-of-pocket costs are much lower since
insurance companies usually ask for a lower cost share to induce patients to choose
less expensive generic alternatives.
Next, I discuss evidence of consumer dynamics in the data. I define days of
treatment as the minimum of the days of supply for a prescription and the number
of days between the prescription and the next one. Also, following Crawford and
Shum (2005), I define a drug “spell” to be a sequence of one or more prescriptions to a
single molecule or molecule-version. Table 2.2 shows that an average patient has 6.7
prescriptions and 10.7 months of treatment in the one year and a half window. The
average number of spells for molecules is about 1.2 and for molecule-versions is about
1.3, implying that patients in the sample do not change drugs very frequently. The
patterns of inter-molecule switching shown in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 are consistent
with this finding. The switch probabilities are high at the beginning of a treatment.
Less than 3% of the patients switch to another molecule after the fifth prescription
or 120 days of treatment. The high switch probabilities are probably resulted from
experimentation. At the beginning of a treatment, doctors are trying different drugs
to find the best fit for their patients. Once they learn that a drug matches a patient
well, they would keep prescribing the drug for the patient.
Finally, I look at patients’ switching to generic simvastatin after Zocor’s patent
expiration on June 23, 2006. Figure 2.1 shows that over 55% of patients who took
4 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted a 180-day exclusivity to Teva and Ranbaxy
to sell generic simvastatins since they are the first challengers of Zocor’s primary US patent. Thus,
during the 180 days after Zocor’s patent expiration, there were only three generic manufacturers:
the two independent generic producers and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, which received a license from
Merck to sell “authorized” generic simvastatin.
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Zocor before and still want to take Zocor choose generic simvastatin over the branded
version when generic simvastatins are available. This seems to imply that the low
out-of-pocket costs for generic simvastatin make them very attractive. Figure 2.2, on
the other hand, shows that those who have taken Zocor for more than 10 months are
less willing to switch to the generic version. About half of them stay with branded
Zocor, compared to less than 35% of those with less experience with Zocor. Those
who have used Zocor for more than 10 months may face lower out-of-pocket costs for
branded Zocor and/or have learned that the branded version is something they really
like after using it for a long time. The result suggests that learning at the version
level may take longer. To disentangle the price effect from the learning effect, we
need a model that can handle both at the same time.
2.3 Model
Consider a patient i who goes to a doctor in period t to seek treatment for high
cholesterol. After diagnosing the patient and observing her copayments for each
drug (pcijt) as well as her prescription history, the doctor selects drug j from the
choice set Jt for the patient.5 A drug here is a combination of a molecule and a
version (branded or generic), e.g. branded atorvastatin, generic simvastatin, etc.
The utility patient i derives from drug j in period t is
Uijt  ζj   αp
c
ijt   β1I pmijt1  1q   β2I pdijt1  1q
 Xmijtβ3  X
d
ijtβ4   ijt (2.1)
 uijt   ijt,
5 Due to the data limitations, I am not able to distinguish the roles of doctors and patients.
Thus, I assume that there is no agency issue and that doctors always act in the best interest of the
patients.
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where ζj is the base utility from drug j (drug fixed effect),6 pcijt the out-of-pocket
cost for drug j paid by patient i in period t, mijt a dummy variable equal to one
if the doctor chooses the molecule of drug j for patient i in period t, dijt a dummy
variable equal to one if the doctor chooses drug j for patient i in period t, Xmijt a
vector of dummy variables for past use of drug j’s molecule, Xdijt a vector of dummy
variables for past use of drug j, and ijt an idiosyncratic error term assumed to follow
the Type I Extreme Value distribution.
The variable I pmijt1  1q is an indicator which equals one if the doctor chose
the same molecule of drug j for the patient in the last period, and zero otherwise.
The coefficient β1 thus accounts for the dynamic behaviors of switching costs or
experimenting. A positive β1 induces a inter-molecule switching cost while a negative
β1 implies that doctors like to experiment with various molecules to find the best fit
for the patient. That is, if β1 ¡ 0, patient i’s utility is greater if she takes the same
molecule in a row. If β1   0, the patient prefers to try something different than her
last drug choice.
Similarly, I pdijt1  1q is an indicator which equals one if the doctor chose the
same drug (molecule-version) for the patient in the last period, and zero otherwise.
If I pmijt1  1q  1 but I pdijt1  1q  1, the doctor chooses the same molecule
this period as the molecule for the last period, but she chooses a different version of
the molecule. This will happen when a doctor selected a branded drug last time but
chooses its generic equivalent this time. If I pmijt1  1q  1 and I pdijt1  1q  1,
the doctor chooses the same molecule and the same version for patient i in a row.
If β1   β2 ¡ 0, the patient has inter- and intra-molecule switching cost and she has
greater utility choosing the same molecule and version successively. If β1   β2 ¡ 0
and β2   0, the patient prefers to use the same molecule but try a different version.
6 Since only differences in utility matters in this discrete choice model and we can only identify
relative fixed effects, I normalize the fixed effect for the “other” drugs to be zero.
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Xmijt captures the effect of learning about the molecule of a drug. By including
dummy variables for different lengths of using a molecule, measured by number of
prescriptions or treatment days, we will be able to see whether a patient that receives
multiple prescriptions for the same molecule or several days of treatment with the
molecule has learned that the molecule is effective in lowering her cholesterol level.
For example, a positive coefficient on the dummy I
 
2 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   4

implies that
the patient has tried the drug two or three times and really likes it. In addition,
comparing the coefficients on I
 
2 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   4

and I
 
4 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   6

will
reveal the difference in the degree of learning between a patient with 2 or 3 past
prescriptions and a patient with 4 or 5 past prescriptions for the molecule.
On the other hand, Xdijt captures the effect of learning about the version of a
drug. Xdijt includes dummy variables for different lengths of using a drug (molecule-
version). If the coefficient on I
 
2 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   4

is positive and the coefficient on
I
 
2 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk   4

is positive, a patient with 2 or 3 prescriptions for the drug likes
the molecule as well as the version. However, If the coefficient on I
 
2 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   4

is positive and the coefficient on I
 
2 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk   4

is negative, the patient with
2 or 3 prescriptions for the drug likes the molecule but prefers a different version.
Moreover, we can study how lengths of treatment affect preference for a molecule
and version by comparing the coefficients on the dummies for different lengths of
treatment with a drug.
The assumption that ijt are independent and identically (i.i.d.) distributed Type
1 Extreme Value gives the likelihood of patient i choosing drug j in period t
Pr pdijt  1 | Xitq 
exppuijtq°Jt
l1 exppuiltq
j  1, 2, ..., Jt, (2.2)
where Xit denotes the set of conditioning variables for individual i in period t.
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2.4 Estimation
With the specification of the likelihood of dijt given Xit, we can estimate the param-
eters using maximum likelihood (MLE). The log-likelihood can be written as
log pLpθqq 
T¸
t1
Nt¸
i1
Jt¸
j1
I pdijt  1q log

exppuijtq°Jt
l1 exppuiltq

, (2.3)
where θ is the vector of the unknown parameters. McFadden (1973) has shown that
the log-likelihood function is globally concave and discussed the conditions for MLE
to be consistent and asymptotically normal in this application.
The out-of-pocket cost variable (pcijt) is endogenous since drug with a better
(unobserved) quality can give the patient greater utility and cost more. To alleviate
the bias associated with this endogeneity problem, I make use of the panel structure
of the data by including the drug fixed effect in estimation. Drug quality is not
observable but is assumed to be fixed over time. Thus, adding drug fixed effect can
help solve the problem from endogenous out-of-pocket costs. Identification of the
other parameters relies on the variation in the corresponding variables.
Table 2.5 summarizes the estimation results. First note that the price coefficient is
more negative in the models with drug fixed effect, which implies that the coefficient
is overestimated if we do not add the drug fixed effect. Based on the estimates
from Model (2), the average own price elasticities are between -0.30 and -0.08, and
average cross price elasticities are between 0.006 and 0.4. Additionally, the estimates
for the coefficients Ipdijt1  1q and Ipmijt1  1q are both positive and significant.
This means that there is a positive cost if a patient switch to a different molecule or
version. Other things being equal, patients prefer to take the same drug in this period
as the drug they took in the last period. Furthermore, inter-molecule switching cost
is higher than intra-molecule switching cost since the sum of the two estimated
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coefficients is larger than the estimated coefficient on Ipmijt1  1q.
Results from Model (2) and (4) show that the effects of learning about molecules
are all positive and significant. Also, the longer a patient takes a molecule, the
more likely the patient will keep choosing the molecule. In contrast, the effect of
learning about the version of a drug is not significant for patients who take the
drug for less than 10 prescriptions or 300 days. Only those who have more than
10 past prescriptions or 300 days with a drug demonstrate a significant effect of
learning about versions. The effect of learning about versions is weaker than the
effect of learning about molecules. In other words, patients in general do not learn
to distinguish between versions of a molecule unless they have taken the drug for
a very long time. This is consistent with our findings in the data analysis. When
generics enter the market, the patients with less experience with Zocor are more
likely to switch to generic simvastatin.
The effect of switching costs and learning can be further illustrated in changes
in the probability of choosing a drug for patients with different lengths of taking the
drug. Table 2.6 presents the predicted probabilities of choosing a drug in successive
prescriptions with different lengths of treatment with the drug. The probabilities are
calculated using the estimates from Model (2). The first column in the table shows
that the choice probabilities vary a lot for the first prescription. New patients’ choice
for the first prescription is based on the out-of-pocket costs and the mean utility for
each drug. For the second prescription, the probability of choosing the same drug
increases by more than 40 percentage points. The probability of choosing blockbuster
drug Lipitor jumps from 23.8% to 96.6% after the first use. The probability of
choosing the less attractive drug Pravachol also largely increases from 3.5% to more
than 76.8%. High switching costs thus make a patient quite likely to stay with a
drug even when they use the drug just once.
The probabilities of choosing the same drug for experienced patients are resulted
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from both learning and switching costs. In Table 2.6, the predicted probabilities in
general increase with the lengths of treatment. Also, the difference in the choice
probabilities among drugs becomes smaller as a patient gets more experience with
a drug. Those who have chosen most of the drugs for more than ten successive
prescriptions will be very unlikely to change their mind for the next prescription.
Learning about molecules and switching costs together lead to high probabilities of
choosing a drug in a row.
It is interesting to note the spillover learning effect with Zocor. For a patient
who has taken Zocor for two or three prescriptions, the probability of choosing Zocor
again is less than 50%, compared to more than 80% for the other drugs. This is
because patients’ learning about Zocor’s molecule (simvastatin) benefits the generic
competitors. As discussed above, the effect of learning about molecules is stronger
than the effect of learning about versions. Also, intra-molecule switching cost is
lower. The low cost generic simvastatins is thus very attractive to the experienced
Zocor users and lowers the probability they stick with Zocor.
To sum up, the estimates suggest high switching costs and strong learning effect
at the molecule level in the cholesterol lowering drug market. Effects of learning
about molecules get larger as a patient takes a drug longer. Effects of learning about
drug versions are significant only for the patients who have used a drug for a long
time. In addition, switching costs raise the probability of choosing the same drug for
new patients. Both learning and switching costs contribute to experienced patients’
stickiness.
2.5 Conclusion
The paper estimates a multinomial logit demand model with brand loyalty and learn-
ing using data from cholesterol lowering drug markets in US. The estimation results
imply that there are high switching costs and strong learning effect at the molecule
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level. The longer a patient takes a drug, the stronger the learning effect is. In con-
trast, effects of learning about drug versions are significant only for patients who
have used a drug over 10 months. Also, the predicted choice probabilities show
that switching costs increase probabilities of choosing the same drug for the patients
who just start a treatment. Experienced patients stick to a drug because they have
learned the molecule works well and there are high switching costs.
These results have several implications for drug manufacturers, insurance compa-
nies, and health care policy makers. First, when rolling out a new product in a market
with existing competitors, drug manufacturers should lower the high inter-molecule
switching costs to encourage patients to try it. They can provide free samples to
reduce the financial costs or invest in advertising to lower the information costs.
Second, to encourage generic use and create savings for insurance plans, insurance
companies can consider providing more incentive to those who have never tried the
molecules of the generics. Since it is easier for experienced users of a molecule to
switch to generics after patent expiration, insurance companies can focus more on
new users by further lowering or eliminating their copayment for their first prescrip-
tion for the molecule. Finally, policy makers can provide subsidy to new patients for
their first few prescriptions to improve medication adherence. Once patients learn
the effectiveness of a drug, they can better comply with the treatment.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Product Molecule
Branded/
generic
Date of
entry
In-sample
market share
Ave full price
for 30 days
Ave copay
for 30 days
Lipitor atorvastatin B Jan 97 44.34 84.9 18.6
Vytorin ezetimibe/simvastatin B Jul 04 17.83 78.6 18.4
Crestor rosuvastatin B Aug 03 10.60 79.7 19.7
Zocor simvastatin B Jan 92 9.78 115.3 30.0
Lovastatin lovastatin G Feb 02 8.23 21.4 6.3
Pravachol pravastatin B Nov 91 3.56 117.7 21.5
Simvastatin simvastatin G Jun 06 3.00 93.6 9.1
5 others - B < Jul 02 2.67 80.7 21.3
Note: The level of observations is prescription.
Table 2.2: Overall Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Rx 18,316 6.69 3.90 1 22
Days of treatment 18,316 321.43 136.94 8 838
Number of spells (molecule) 18,316 1.19 0.49 1 13
Number of spells (molecule-version) 18,316 1.25 0.54 1 13
Age 18,316 52.27 8.20 0 64
Female 18,316 0.46 0.50 0 1
Note: The level of observations is patient.
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Table 2.3: Inter-molecule Switch by Prescriptions
Rx No. # patients
# patients with a
molecule switch Percentage
2 17737 1045 5.9%
3 16377 710 4.3%
4 14400 507 3.5%
5 12073 363 3.0%
6 9578 247 2.6%
7 7194 171 2.4%
8 5653 91 1.6%
9 4634 67 1.4%
10 3864 66 1.7%
>10 11769 128 1.1%
Table 2.4: Inter-molecule Switch by Days of Treatment
Days of
Treatment # patients
# patients with a
molecule switch Percentage
30 - 59 18290 741 4.1%
60 - 89 17665 476 2.7%
90 - 119 16952 626 3.7%
120 - 149 16040 274 1.7%
150 - 179 15193 236 1.6%
180 - 209 13836 263 1.9%
210 - 239 12938 138 1.1%
240 - 269 11825 145 1.2%
270 - 299 10437 132 1.3%
>= 300 10152 262 2.6%
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Table 2.5: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Drug Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
pc 0.0202 0.00070.0316 0.00110.0191 0.00070.0312 0.0011
Ipdijt1  1q 1.7061 0.0572 1.6703 0.0632 1.8782 0.0710 1.6540 0.0701
Ipmijt1  1q 2.8287 0.0607 2.8342 0.0670 2.6712 0.0747 2.8335 0.0743
Lengths of treatment in Rx
I

2 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   4
	
1.5500 0.0890 0.6318 0.1008
I

4 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   6
	
1.9101 0.0966 0.8306 0.1097
I

6 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   8
	
2.5066 0.1052 1.4589 0.1275
I

8 ¤
°t1
k1mijk   10
	
2.7167 0.1357 1.5082 0.1570
I

10 ¤
°t1
k1mijk
	
2.8396 0.1393 1.5059 0.1511
I

2 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk   4
	
0.9639 0.08310.1226 0.0964
I

4 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk   6
	
0.8937 0.0853 0.1341 0.1019
I

6 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk   8
	
1.1586 0.08280.2033 0.1128
I

8 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk   10
	
1.0550 0.0982 0.1095 0.1296
I

10 ¤
°t1
k1 dijk
	
0.8264 0.1053 0.5364 0.1268
Lengths of treatment in days
I

60 ¤
°t1
k1Dik mijk   120
	
1.1241 0.1193 0.2119 0.1250
I

120 ¤
°t1
k1Dik mijk   180
	
2.2770 0.1203 1.0738 0.1317
I

180 ¤
°t1
k1Dik mijk   240
	
2.6854 0.1106 1.3961 0.1223
I

240 ¤
°t1
k1Dik mijk   300
	
2.7755 0.1213 1.4988 0.1304
I

300 ¤
°t1
k1Dik mijk
	
2.4194 0.1182 1.1382 0.1266
I

60 ¤
°t1
k1Dik  dijk   120
	
0.6687 0.1139 0.1957 0.1204
I

120 ¤
°t1
k1Dik  dijk   180
	
1.3257 0.11100.1596 0.1243
I

180 ¤
°t1
k1Dik  dijk   240
	
1.6931 0.09780.3776 0.1144
I

240 ¤
°t1
k1Dik  dijk   300
	
1.4810 0.10020.1522 0.1167
I

300 ¤
°t1
k1Dik  dijk
	
0.8956 0.0980 0.4285 0.1152
Drug fixed effect No Yes No Yes
# obs 121033 121033 121033 121033
Log-likelihood value -56940.9 -50349.5 -56993.4 -50422.8
Note: Homoskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. Dik is days of treatment for patient i
in period k.
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Table 2.6: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing the Same Drug
Cumulative Rx with Product
Product 0 1 2 - 3 4 - 5 6 - 7 8 - 9 >= 10
Crestor 0.0800 0.8872 0.9290 0.9538 0.9650 0.9754 0.9838
Lipitor 0.2381 0.9658 0.9792 0.9867 0.9900 0.9930 0.9954
Lovastatin 0.0538 0.8370 0.8953 0.9309 0.9475 0.9628 0.9754
Other 0.0265 0.7109 0.8036 0.8658 0.8962 0.9253 0.9499
Pravachol 0.0353 0.7681 0.8465 0.8968 0.9208 0.9435 0.9623
Simvastatin 0.3707 0.9489 0.9505 0.9625 0.9520 0.9646 0.9766
Vytorin 0.1222 0.9264 0.9544 0.9706 0.9779 0.9845 0.9898
Zocor 0.0735 0.4919 0.4709 0.5370 0.4572 0.5355 0.6385
Note: Choice probabilities are evaluated at mean out-of-pocket costs.
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Figure 2.1: Choice Between Zocor and Simvastatin by Number of Prescriptions
with Zocor
Figure 2.2: Choice Between Zocor and Simvastatin by Days of Treatment with
Zocor
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3Competition and Dynamic Pricing in a Perishable
Goods Market
3.1 Introduction
Sellers of perishable goods, such as airlines, ticket brokers, concert organizers and
retailers of fashion and seasonal items, have to sell inventory within a fixed time
horizon. These firms increasingly use dynamic pricing (DP) strategies, where they
change prices as a function of both inventory and the time remaining, as technology
makes it cheaper to change prices, track inventory and model consumer behavior.
Managers often identify these types of revenue management strategies as being very
valuable. For example, Robert Crandall, the former CEO of American Airlines,
has been widely quoted as describing them as “the single most important techni-
cal development in transportation management since we entered the era of airline
deregulation in 1979.”1
1 Smith et al. (1992) estimate that yield management increased AA’s annual revenues by $500
million. The San Francisco Giants implemented dynamic pricing for parts of their stadium in
2010 and estimated that it would increase their revenues by $5m per year and the Giants’ ticketing
manager described DP as “changing the ticket world” (taken from an article by Adam Satarino in
Bloomberg Businessweek, May 20 2010, accessed July 19, 2011).
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The theoretical basis of DP strategies is now well-established, principally in
cases where there is a single seller (see references below). However, there are few
empirically-tractable models that can be used to guide managers’ pricing decisions,
especially in settings where (a) products are differentiated; (b) there is significant
competition from other sellers; and (c) it is possible that the price that the manager
sets will affect the prices that competitors set in the future. These features are
present in all of the examples of perishable goods markets given above. In this
paper, we introduce an empirical model that can be used for this purpose, and we
show how it can be estimated using the type of data that a seller will typically have
available. We use our model to analyze whether the pricing strategy that a seller
currently uses is approximately optimal.
Our empirical setting is an online secondary ticket market (Stubhub) for sports
event tickets. We use data for 15 home games played by a single major league
sports team in 2010, where an anonymous large broker, who provided us with its
sales data and whose explicit objective is revenue-maximization, accounted for a
significant share of the market. In this market the broker faces competition from
a large number of smaller sellers, many of whom are season ticket holders who do
not want to attend a particular game. There are three features of the data that
make the broker’s dynamic price-setting problem an interesting one to study, both
methodologically and substantively.
First, the broker cuts prices over time, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, where prices are
relative to the face value of the ticket. The general pattern of falling prices has been
documented using different data from secondary ticket markets by Sweeting (2012).
The ability to reduce prices as the game approaches if tickets remain unsold makes
it optimal to set higher prices further from the game, rationalizing a price-cutting
pattern.
Second, most of the broker’s sales are made in the last few days before the game
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when the broker’s prices are lowest, as shown in Figure 3.2. This raises the question
of whether it is optimal for the seller to delay so long before cutting prices, or whether
he would be better off setting a slightly lower price further from the game in order to
increase his probability of sale when competitors prices tend to be higher. It is not
clear ex-ante whether the broker’s current pricing rules achieve the trade-off between
higher prices and lower probabilities of sale optimally.
Third, competition and price-setting work in an interesting way which is also
found in lots of other markets but which has been ignored in the existing literature.
Different sellers compete with each other, but they know that they update their
prices only infrequently and, importantly, not at the same time. Therefore, when
a seller sets his price today he knows that other sellers will treat this price as given
when setting their prices in the future. We show below that non-brokers cut prices in
response to the broker’s price cutting policy, which may reduce the broker’s profits,
and our results suggest that the broker may respond sub-optimally to the prices set by
non-brokers. From a modeling perspective, the existing literature has either modeled
monopolists or a fixed number of competing firms who set prices simultaneously.
Providing an empirical framework to model this type of stochastic pricing decisions
is an important contribution of this paper, which may be relevant for thinking about
a wide range of markets.
Central to our paper is an estimable continuous time model of the market where
potential buyers, sellers and opportunities to change prices arrive stochastically. The
optimal dynamic pricing policy for our broker depends qualitatively on several factors
that are clearly related to particular parameters of the model: the arrival rate and
preferences of consumers, and particularly their price sensitivity; the probability with
which the broker can change prices and the number of listings that he has to sell; and,
how the distribution of competitors’ prices can be expected to respond to the price
that the broker sets. We provide a quantitative assessment of the broker’s optimal
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policy by estimating the parameters of the model and then performing counterfactual
simulations. We find that, on average, the broker’s prices close to the game are fairly
close to optimal but that there are potential advantages to using different pricing
rules further from the gain and from updating prices more frequently.
Our paper makes at least three contributions. First, we provide the first em-
pirical framework for calculating optimal dynamic pricing policies in a setting with
competing sellers, and we provide an assessment of a pricing policy that is used in
this type of setting. Our framework could be applied to other markets where a seller
has some ability to ‘move the market’ by affecting the distribution of prices that
competitors set in the future. Second, we show how our model can be estimated
using data that may be widely available to sellers. For example, we assume only
the availability of transaction data from one seller, not competing sellers in the mar-
ket. Our methods build on techniques recently developed for estimating continuous
time games in the economics literature (Arcidiacono et al. (2012)). Finally, we can
use the estimated model to highlight which parameters are key for determining the
optimal pricing policy. We do this using counterfactual policies, where we vary the
parameters from their estimated values.
We conclude this introduction by describing the most closely-related theoretical
and empirical literature. Section 3.2 describes our data, and highlights the stylized
facts that motivate our analysis. Section 3.3 presents the model and Section 3.4
describes how it is estimated. Section 3.5 presents the estimates and Section 3.6 the
results of our counterfactuals. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1.1 Literature Review
The theoretical literature on dynamic pricing, reviewed in Elmaghraby and Ke-
skinocak (2003), dates back to Kincaid and Darling (1963). In this paper, and in
later papers such as Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), Bitran and Mondschein (1997)
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and McAfee and Velde (2008) a monopolist seller of a perishable good, with a fixed
initial inventory, faces consumers who arrive stochastically, have to buy at once or
exit the market and have unit demand with valuations drawn from a time-invariant
distribution. In Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) and McAfee and Velde (2008) the
seller is assumed to update its price continuously, whereas Bitran and Mondschein
(1997) assume that he updates it infrequently using a policy of periodic price re-
views. With continuous updating, the optimal price is equal to the opportunity cost
of a sale plus a mark-up, which depends on the shape of the valuation distribution
(equivalently the flow demand curve). This opportunity cost will go down over time
if sales are not made as future selling opportunities disappear. On the other hand,
when a sale is made opportunity costs will increase. McAfee and Te Velde (2006)
show that on average the seller tends to cut prices, if he has any units left, at the
end of the time horizon.
Many of the assumptions made in these papers have been relaxed in the subse-
quent theoretical literature. Zhao and Zheng (2000) allow for time-varying elastici-
ties of demand which can change how optimal prices tend to evolve. For example,
if demand becomes more elastic closer to the game, which may happen if the type of
consumer who visits the market changes, it will be optimal to set lower prices. We
allow for this type of variation when we estimate our model. We also allow for com-
petition between a small number of sellers. In the existing literature competition
has been handled in a particular stylized way. For example, Gallego and Hu (2014)
and Xu and Hopp (2006) provide methods for solving continuous time models with
a fixed number of ex-ante symmetric firms. Lin and Sibdari (2009) solve a discrete
time game where logit differentiated duopolists set prices each period, and they show
how it can be optimal to raise its price in order to make it more likely that its com-
petitor sells out and leaves the market. All of these models neglect the possibility
that new sellers may enter, which is a clear feature of our data and allowed for in
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our model, and they also assume that sellers adjust prices simultaneously. This can
mean either instantaneously in continuous time or every period in discrete time. Our
model assumes that opportunities to change prices only arise stochastically, which
is a realistic assumption for online markets where firms may only review their prices
infrequently. If prices are strategic complements, the stochastic nature of price set-
ting might increase incentives to raise prices further from the game. One feature
which is not included in our model, which has been included in some of the recent
theoretical literature, is strategic consumers, who can respond to higher prices by
waiting in the market. This can make demand a long time before the game more
elastic, leading to lower prices. Sweeting (2012) provides evidence against this type
of strategic consumer behavior being of first-order importance in secondary market
for event tickets.
The empirical dynamic pricing literature has focused on two questions. The
first question is which existing theories of dynamic pricing explain how sellers price,
assuming that they behave optimally (McAfee and Te Velde (2006), Puller et al.
(2009), Sweeting (2012)). The second question is whether firms set prices optimally,
assuming that a particular model is correct and this is also the question in our paper.
The existing studies of this question, such as Heching et al. (2002), Vulcano et al.
(2010), Caro and Gallien (2012), Soysal and Krishnamurthi (2012) and Li et al.
(2011), focus on a single seller, although Vulcano et al. (2010) allow for consumers to
substitute between multiple products sold by the same seller, in that case a fashion
retailer. In our paper, we want to investigate how competition between sellers - in
particular a large broker and many smaller sellers - should affect pricing. There
are two elements to this competition effect: first, as other sellers cut prices, it may
be optimal for the broker to set a lower price, and the importance of this may vary
with the time until the game; and, second, the broker might strategically want to
influence how other sellers prices evolve as suggested above. In doing so, we assume
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that consumers are not strategic (i.e., they have to buy as soon as they arrive or
exit the market), an assumption that has been relaxed in Soysal and Krishnamurthi
(2012) and Li et al. (2011), although including strategic consumers in the model
would be an interesting direction for future research.2
Solving for equilibrium strategies in a dynamic pricing model with many, possi-
bly asymmetric, competing sellers is beyond the current literature. In this paper
we therefore take a simpler approach to modeling seller behavior, based on the es-
timation of policy functions as functions of the state variables. This approach has
been widely used in the literature estimating dynamic games in economics (Bajari
et al. (2007), Ryan (2012)), although applying it here requires us to innovate because
our data involves repeated snapshots of a market that evolves continuously. We use
the estimated functions describing how other sellers’ prices evolve, to conduct coun-
terfactuals, as in Benkard et al. (2010). This makes the strong assumption that a
change in the broker’s policy would not change the entry, exit and pricing policies of
other sellers, although it may change the exact prices that they set. There are some
ways to test this assumption and we will do so in future work.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Sources
Our data comes from three sources: a professional ticket broker, Stubhub.com and
the official website of the major league sports team whose games we use in our
analysis. The broker provided us with its transaction data for games played by
the team from December 2009 to April 2010. This data includes details of the
exact seats (section, row, seat number) sold, the sale price, the time at which the
2 As mentioned before, the results in Sweeting (2012) suggest that strategic consumer behavior
is not too important in secondary ticket markets, possibly because the nominal gains to optimal
timing decisions are quite small. Li et al. (2011) find that the proportion of strategic consumers in
most markets for airline tickets, where the nominal gains are potentially larger because prices are
higher, is not too large.
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broker registered the sale in its internal system and the distribution channel through
which the sale took place. It also lists the tickets that the broker had that were
not eventually sold, although for this team the broker sells the vast majority of his
listings. In this paper we use data from 14 games and we only use data on listing
and sales on Stubhub, which was the outlet for most of the broker’s listings as well
as being the largest online secondary market for event tickets.
The Stubhub data was collected using a web scraper from the ‘buy page’ for each
game. Our aim was to collect a snapshot of all tickets available on Stubhub about
once every three hours, although in practice problems with the web scraper caused
by Stubhub changing the presentation of its website, meant that the dataset is not
complete, which is one reason why we pool games in estimation. This data contains
the section, row, number of seats available and list price for each listing posted. The
seller can also indicate whether a smaller number of tickets can be purchased, and
sellers typically do this when they are trying to sell three or more seats. Stubhub
does not show information about the seller as it provides a guarantee that someone
buying from its site will receive tickets at least as good as those purchased. It also
charges sizable commissions to both buyers (10%) and sellers (15%), and sets the
shipping fees that have to be paid.
To estimate demand for listings on Stubhub, we need to match the listing data on
Stubhub with the broker data. The aim of this matching process is to both identify
which tickets on Stubhub belong to the broker and the prices that he set prior to
sale, and to identify when broker sales occur and what was the competition that
the broker’s listings faced at the time of sale. The matching process is described in
detail in the Appendix. Finally, the team’s website was used to obtain the single
game price (face value) of tickets in every section. During our sample, the team had
a successful season, with realized attendances of at least 96% of stadium capacity for
all of the 14 games that we use in estimation.
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3.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 shows how many downloads of data from Stubhub that we have for each
game as the game approaches. The left-hand column shows the number of number
of days prior to the game (so the top line is the day of the game), and each entry
gives the number of downloads of data that we have. For example, when the number
is 8, we have one download on average every three hours. For the first games in our
sample, we lack data a long time before the game simply because these games are
in January and we only started collecting data in December. For the later games,
we have a fairly complete dataset for the month prior to the game, and when we
interpret our results we will focus on this final month which is when the market is
busiest and the most interesting price dynamics occur (Sweeting (2012)) shows that
this is also true in the market for MLB tickets, using data for all teams).
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for the broker’s and competitors listings on
Stubhub, both in the full sample and in the set of game-sections that we use in
estimation. The main criteria for selecting these listings is that these are game-
sections where the broker has at most one listing (e.g., one group of 6 seats in the
same row). On average, competitors set prices that are close to face value whereas the
broker sets lower prices. This pattern is consistent - in an optimal pricing framework
- with the broker having no value to unsold tickets, whereas other sellers may be
willing to attend the game themselves. This pattern is true for both the full sample
and the estimation sample, although more expensive sections are over-represented
in the estimation sample. The broker never has seats in the front row of a section,
whereas about 7% of competitors’ listings are for front-row seats. These listings may
well be posted by season-ticket holders who are more likely to own front-row seats.
The average number of seats in a broker’s listing is 4.27, with a range from 1 to 23.
However, 25% of these listings had two seats, 32.1% had four seats and 26% had five
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or six seats, with 90% having six seats or less. When we estimate the model we only
use those observations where the broker has no more than six seats to sell.
Table 3.3 shows many seats the broker sells when a transaction takes place. The
most common transaction involves a pair of seats, often from a larger listing. As we
illustrate below, this can have an important impact on the optimal profile of prices
as the optimal price increases when a sale of a subset of seats from a listing takes
place. At the moment when we estimate the dynamic model we assume that all
buyers who arrive in the market only want two seats, although when we estimate the
demand parameters we are more flexible. Going forward we will try to incorporate
the arrival of buyers wanting more than two seats into the model. A comparison of
the number of observations for the broker and competitors in the estimation sample
indicates that the broker has about 20% of listings in this sample.
3.2.3 Stylized Facts and Current Broker Pricing Behavior
We now describe how prices evolve over time, and what are the key facts about how
the broker currently sells tickets that motivate our interest in his optimal pricing
policy.
As prices and games are heterogeneous, we examine the dynamics of prices using
a regression model
pit  Xitβ  Dtα   FEi   εit
where Xit are observed characteristics (e.g., the number of seats, the number of the
row and measures of the performance of the home and away teams that may affect
demand), Dt are dummies measuring the number of days prior to the game and FEi
are game-face value fixed effects. Prices (pit) are the Stubhub list price divided by
the face value of the ticket, although using the log of the nominal price gives broadly
similar implications.
The coefficients are shown in Table 3.4, using different subsets of the data. In
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columns (1)-(4) observations are listings. The specifications differ in whether the
sample comprises the broker’s listings, competitors’ listings, and whether or not the
observations are from game-sections included in the estimation sample. Here we see
that based on all of the data, non-brokers tend to maintain fairly constant prices just
above face value (add together the price 0-2 days before the game and the relevant
time coefficient) until the last few days before the game. Figure 3.3 also shows this
average price path. On the other hand, the broker cuts prices more smoothly as a
game approaches, dropping prices by 20% of face value in the last five days before
the game and an additional 30% of face value in the 10 days before that. As can
be seen in the Figure, the broker’s average list prices are always below those of the
average non-broker.
However, despite always having lower prices, most of the broker’s sales are con-
centrated immediately before the game. Figure 3.4 shows how the sales rate of the
broker evolves as a game approaches, where this rate is defined as the number of
sales that the broker makes during the day divided by the number of listings that
the broker has at the start of the day. This rate can be greater than 1 because a single
listing can result in more than one transaction if multiple subsets of the tickets listed
are sold. The sales rate climbs steeply in the last five days before the game. This
could be caused by the broker’s falling price, a decline in the number of competitor
listings, which can be seen in Figure 3.5, or an increase in the number of buyers in
the market. If the last two factors drive the increase in demand, this might suggest
that the broker could raise his revenues by not cutting prices so dramatically. On
the other hand, if it is the broker’s lower price that increases his demand, this may
suggest that the broker would do better by setting a slightly lower price earlier before
the game to increase the likelihood that he sells. Our model helps us to distinguish
what drives the increase in sale, and therefore to establish what the optimal pricing
policy should be.
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A comparison of columns (1) and (3) in Table 3.4 also highlights another poten-
tially important factor in a seller’s pricing decision. Using the full sample, which
mainly consists of sections where the broker is not trying to sell tickets, competitors’
maintain fairly constant prices until quite close to the game. On the other hand,
when we use the estimation sample, which only includes sections where the broker
has tickets and is cutting prices, we observe that non-brokers are cutting prices too.
Assuming that it is the price cutting behavior of the broker that causes the non-
brokers to cut their prices (which should be true as long as the sections in which the
broker has tickets are random, as all of these specifications include game-face value
fixed effects), this suggests that if market demand is low in the weeks prior to the
game, the broker may be hurting himself when he cuts prices by causing his com-
petitors’ prices to fall, thereby reducing the price that he can set when the market
is very active close to the game.
3.3 Model
Calculating the broker’s optimal pricing rule requires a model that predicts (i) the
probability that the broker will sell as a function of the broker’s price and the price of
competitors; and (ii) how competitors’ prices will evolve as a function of the broker’s
price. We now describe the parsimonious, continuous time model that provides us
with these predictions.
In outline, the model works in the following way: at any point in time the broker
and his competitors have given numbers of tickets and particular prices for their
listings. A number of stochastic events, with Poisson arrivals, can happen. These
events are: (i) a potential buyer may arrive in the market, in which case she can
choose to buy one of the available listings or exit the market forever. We therefore
assume away the possibility that potential buyers can strategically delay purchasing,
so that a buyer has a static, rather than a dynamic, problem to solve; (ii) the broker
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may change his price; (iii) a competitor may enter the market, exit the market
(without being sold, e.g., the seller decides to go to the game himself) or change his
price. We model a specific arrival rate for each of these events and we model, as a
stochastic process, what happens when one of these events occurs.
To explain the model we begin by specifying the static, logit preferences of a
buyer. This is useful as the state space of the dynamic model is defined using these
preferences, following ideas in Nevo and Rossi (2008). We then explain how we
parametrize the arrival rates and the evolution of the state variables. We model
markets at the game-section level, and, in estimation, we use game-sections where
the broker has only one set of tickets to sell (e.g., a group of 6 seats in row 8). In
some ways this is too narrow, as consumers are likely to substitute across similar
sections, but this approach means that we only have to deal with the broker setting
a single price, which is easier in the counterfactuals. In future iterations, we hope to
be more general. When estimating the dynamic part of the model we also assume
that buyers are only interested in buying a pair of seats (recall, 54% of purchases are
of two seats), although we are more flexible when estimating preferences.
3.3.1 Buyer Demand
We follow most of the literature on consumer demand by assuming that a buyer i
arriving in the market will choose the listing that maximizes his utility, where his
utility for listing j is given by a linear function:
uij  xjβ  αpj   εij  δj   εij (3.1)
where xj are listing j’s characteristics (specifically, the row), pj is the price (measured
relative to face value) and εij is a Type I extreme value (logit) error that indepen-
dently and identically distributed across listings. The δs are known as “mean utili-
ties”. When faced by a set of K listings in a market, the probability that consumer
77
buys listing j is
Prpi chooses jq  exppδjq
1  
°K
k1 exppδkq
(3.2)
where the 1 in the denominator reflects the fact that the consumer may choose not
to purchase any tickets. We assume that a consumer who wants to buy two seats
chooses from the set of listings that have at least two seats (this implicitly assumes
that all listings with more than two seats allow only two seats to be bought, which
is true in 85% of cases, and in 95% of cases with four or more seats), whereas a
consumer who wants to buy four seats chooses from the set of listings with at least
four seats, and so on. Apart from through this effect on the choice set, the number
of seats in a listing is assumed to have no effect on choice probabilities.3
3.3.2 State Space
Dealing with a large state space, containing information on the prices, rows and
number of seats being sold in each listing is infeasible (at least using our current
estimation methodology). Therefore we need to reduce the number of state variables,
and to do so we base our model on the δ (mean utility) terms implied by preferences.
Specifically, the state of a particular game-section is defined by the number of seats
that the broker has left to sell (2, 4 or 6), δB of the broker’s listing and the value of
δNB for non-brokers’ listings where
δNB  log
 ¸
kPNB
exppδˆkq

.
For estimation, we discretize the values of the δB and δNB state variables. Specif-
ically we allow for 23 bins of δB, including an absorbing state associated with all of
3 For example, this rules out the possibility that someone who wants to buy two seats might prefer
to buy two out of four seats in order to increase the probability that they will have an empty seat
next to them.
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the broker’s tickets having been sold, and 23 bins for δNB, including a state where
no non-broker tickets are available. The boundaries of the bins are chosen so that
roughly equal number of observations are in each bin.
3.3.3 State Transition Probabilities
In a continuous time, the probability of a transition from one state to another is
determined by the arrival rate of the relevant event and the conditional probability
of that particular transition given that an event arrives. For example, the probability
that the number of broker’s tickets falls by two is determined by the arrival rate of a
buyer and the probability that an arriving buyer purchases from the broker’s listing.
Similarly, the probability that δB changes from one value to another is determined by
the arrival rate of a move where the broker can change his price and the probability
that the price change takes the value of δB to its new level. In continuous time we
can treat these events as happening individually, as the probability that two events
happen at the same instant is zero. I now describe each of these stochastic processes
in turn.
The modeling of state transitions statistical processes is quite similar to ap-
proaches that have recently been taken to the estimation of dynamic games where
players are assumed to use Markov Perfect equilibrium strategies (Ryan (2012);
Benkard et al. (2010); Bajari et al. (2007)). However, although we assuming that
transitions are functions of the previous state, we do not assume that either the
broker or his competitors set prices in an optimal way. This reflects the fact that
our question pre-supposes that even the largest seller may not set prices optimally.
Buyer Arrival and Purchase
Two broker tickets are sold if a buyer arrives and chooses to buy from the broker’s
listing. The Poisson arrival rate for a buyer is given by λBUY ER and the probability
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that an arriving buyer purchases two tickets from the broker is
exppδBq
1   exppδBq   pINB  0qexppδNBq
where pINB  0q means that there is a non-broker listing present. The arrival rate
for buyers is allowed to vary as a game approaches, so that we can capture the
market becoming more active over time. If a broker ticket is bought, the number
of remaining broker tickets changes mechanically or, if the final broker tickets are
bought, the state changes to the absorbing one where there are no broker tickets left.
Of course, it may be the case that the buyer arrives and buys non-broker tickets
which may cause the value of δNB to change. The probability that a non-broker
listing is sold is
exppδNBq
1   exppδBq   pINB  0qexppδNBq
and we model the evolution of δNB if this happens using a transition matrix PNB
which allows for the possibility for δNB to evolve to any lower value or stay the same.
If the consumer chooses to buy no listing, he exits the market without the state
changing.
Broker Price Change
We assume that opportunities for a price change arrive stochastically. The Poisson
arrival rate for a broker change is λBROKER and, conditional on a move arriving, δB
is assumed to evolve according to a stochastic process:
δa
1
B  α0   α1δ
a
B   α2pINB  0q  δbNB   α3p1  pINB  0qq   ξ1 (3.3)
where ξB is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ21. Given
the discrete nature of the state space this implies that the probability of the next
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value of δB being δa
1
B is
φ

δa
1
Bα0α1δ
a
Bα2pINB0qδ
b
NBα3p1pINB0qq
σ1


°
a2 φ

δa
2
B α0α1δ
a
Bα2pINB0qδ
b
NBα3p1pINB0qq
σ1
	 (3.4)
where φpq is the standard normal probability density function and the αs and σ1 are
parameters to estimate.
Non-Broker State Change
δNB may change if more sellers enter the market, sellers leave the market or an
existing seller changes his price. As we have aggregated non-broker listings into a
single variable, we cannot model individual decisions, but we do model three process
by which δNB may change.
The first process, which one can think of as “non-broker arrival” allows for the
possibility that non-broker listings will enter the market when there were none pre-
viously. The Poisson arrival rate is λNB,IN , and the probability that the state
pnB, δ
a
B, INB  0q moves to state pnB, δaB, δbNBq is
exppη1δaB   η2δbNB   η3δaB  δbNBq
1  
°
δkNB ,k0
exppη1δaB   η2δkNB   η3δaB  δkNBq
(3.5)
where the ηs are parameters to estimate. Note that this function allows the new
value of δNB to depend on the value of δB as we would expect it to do if competitors
set lower prices when the broker has a lower price. We could enrich this specification
to also depend on the number of tickets that the broker has left.
The second process, which one can think of as “non-broker exit” allows for the
possibility that non-broker listings will exit the market without being sold. The
Poisson arrival rate is λNB,OUT and the probability that the state changes from
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pnB, δ
a
B, δ
b
NBq to pnB, δaB, INB  0q is
exppκ1δaB   κ2δbNB   κ3δaB  δbNBq
1   exppκ1δaB   κ2δbNB   κ3δaB  δbNBq
(3.6)
where the κs are parameters to be estimated.
The third process is a change in δNB which does not involve the INB  0 state.
One can think of this a non-broker price change although it could also represent the
entry or exit of a subset of non-broker listings. The Poisson arrival rate of this event
is λNB,CHANGE, and we assume that δNBwould evolve according to an stochastic
process where
δb
1
NB  τ0   τ1δ
a
B   τ2δ
b
NB   ξ2 (3.7)
where ξ2 is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ22. The
corresponding conditional probability can be expressed in a form similar to (3.4).
3.4 Estimation
There are two steps in our estimation. In the first stage we estimate the preference
parameters, in order to define the value of the state variables. In the second stage
we estimate the transition functions.
3.4.1 Preference Parameters
As discussed above, the probability that a consumer who arrives in the market pur-
chases a ticket listed by the broker is
Prpi chooses jq  exppδjq
1  
°K
k1 exppδkq
(3.8)
where
δj  xjβ  αpj (3.9)
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To estimate the parameters β and αwe have to take into account that no buyers may
arrive. For clarity, suppose that we are interested in whether two seats are sold from
a listing j that has four seats between two particular downloads. We parametrize
this probability in the following way
Prptwo tickets purchased from jq  exppWgγq1   exppWgγq
exppxjβ  αpjq
1  
°K
k1 exppxkβ  αpkq
(3.10)
where the first term is used to represent in a reduced-form way the probability that
a buyer who wants two seats arrives. W contains dummies for the number of tickets
being purchased (e.g., constant, 4 seats or 6 seats), dummies for 0 to 5, 6 to 10, 11
to 20 and more than 21 days before the game, to capture differences in the arrival
rates, and weekend, working day time dummy and nighttime dummies to capture the
possibility that arrival rates may also differ during the day. For a two seat purchase
the sum over listings in the denominator of the second term would be over all listings
with at least two seats. For a four seat listing it would be over listings with at least
four seats. Estimation is done using Maximum Likelihood.
We note that this specification is not ideal. In particular, it assumes that at most
one customer turns up between downloads and that the set of listings available to that
customer is the set of listings available at the first download. These assumptions are
not too unreasonable given that we are using downloads that are three hours apart
but it could be improved upon.
3.4.2 State Space Definition
As described above, we use the estimated preference parameters to calculate the
values of δB and δNB that define the state space. The bins that we use for these
values are shown in Figure 3.6.
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3.4.3 Estimation of the Continuous Time Processes
Our data comes in the form of snapshots of the state of the Stubhub market every
few hours, plus indicators for when a sale from a broker listing is made between the
downloads. Our model of how the market evolves is in continuous time, so that any
number of events may happen between downloads. We therefore need to use our
model to calculate the probability that the market will be in each possible state at
the next download given the current state. The math of continuous time Markov
processes makes this straightforward to do.
The first step is to construct the “intensity matrices” (Q, dimension 1, 519 x 1, 519
where 1,519 is the total number of states) for each event, which summarizes the finite
Markov jump process. Entry Qxpm,nq pm  nq equals the Poisson arrival rate of
the event multiplied by the conditional probability of moving from state m to state n
given that the relevant event arrives. The diagonal elements of the intensity matrix
is the minus sum of the other elements in the row so that the sum of the elements
in a row is 0. For example, the intensity matrix for the event associated with a
buyer arriving, QBUY ER, has the elements corresponding to the broker sale in state
pnB, δ
a
B, δ
b
NBq equal to arrival rate λBUY ER multiplied by the probabilities associated
with the broker’s tickets being bought so that nB falls by two, or non-broker tickets
being purchased so that δNB changes according to matrix PNB. Off-diagonal elements
associated with the values of nB or δNB increasing would be equal to zero. Intensity
matrices for broker price changes (QBROKER), non-broker entry (QNB,IN), non-broker
exit (QNB,OUT ) and non-broker price change (QNB,CHANGE) are defined similarly.
The “aggregate intensity matrix” is calculated by summing up the intensity ma-
trices, i.e. Q  QBUY ER   QBROKER   QNB,IN   QNB,OUT   QNB,CHANGE. The
transition matrix P ptq, which reflects the probability of transitioning from one state
to the other after a time of length t (via any combination of state changes), can be
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found as the unique solution to the system of ordinary differential equations
P 1ptq  P ptqQ
P p0q  I (3.11)
where I is the identity matrix of the same size as P ptq. Solving the above system of
equations gives P ptq  etQ, a matrix exponential which is calculated using EXPOKIT
in MATLAB. With the transition matrix, we are able to find the corresponding
likelihood for each observation and estimate the transition parameters using MLE.
The log-likelihood function for transition parameters (θ2) is
Lpθ2q 
¸
g
¸
jPg
logP ptj,Θqpsj1, sjq (3.12)
where sj is the state index for observation j, Θ are all of the parameters, g denotes the
game, j1 denotes the previous download and tj is the time between the downloads
of observation j  1 and j
3.5 Parameter Estimates
We now discuss the parameter estimates, with the counterfactuals presented in the
next section.
Table 3.5 shows the first stage estimates. Higher prices significantly reduce the
probability that a listing is sold, with an average own price elasticity, conditional on
the arrival of a buyer, of -4.44, which is the range usually considered for consumer
markets although it is below the elasticities sometimes found for undifferentiated
products sold via price search engines on the internet (Ellison and Ellison (2009)).4
4 Ellison and Ellison look at unbranded memory chips and other computer components sold by
small firms that are listed on Pricewatch.com. For the lowest quality chips estimated elasticities
are around -25, which is exceptionally high, whereas for medium and high quality chips, for which
it is harder to compare prices, elasticities are in the range of 4 to 7. Obviously if there is some
endogeneity of price (caused,by, for example, positive demand shocks) we may underestimate the
elasticity of demand resulting in optimal prices that are too high. Future versions will include more
fixed effects to see if we can get this elasticity to increase.
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We also tried interacting the price coefficient with the number of days to go, to
see if there was evidence consistent with the type of consumer who is in the market
changing over time. However, in most of these specifications there was no clear
pattern to the interaction coefficients and they were imprecisely estimated. The
coefficient on row is negative, and significant at the 5% level, implying (sensibly)
that consumers value rows that are further back less. We have tried to incorporate
additional terms to capture whether front row seats are much more attractive, but
the coefficient on this term was never precisely estimated. This partly reflects the
fact that the broker never has front row seats in our sample. The coefficients on the
W variables are also sensible, consistent with the market being more active close to
the game, two seat buyers being the most common and the market being more active
during the workday and at night than during the early morning (12 am to 6 am is
the excluded category).
The second stage estimates of the state transitions are in Table 3.6. Before
we discuss the results, it is worth commenting that one potential problem when
estimating such a large number of parameters is that maximum likelihood may not
find a global maximum. However, when we re-started the estimation from quite
different sets of parameters we got almost identical coefficients, indicating that this
is not a significant problem in our setting.
The signs and size of most of the coefficients are intuitive. Beginning with the
arrival rates (λ), we see that all the arrival rates increase as a game approaches,
consistent that there are both more consumers in the market and that sellers are more
likely to change their prices as the moment when the tickets “perish” approaches.
The high rate of non-broker exit in the last five days is also driven by Stubhub’s rule
that hard copies of tickets can only be sold in the last three days if they are provided
to Stubhub. This constraint does not affect the broker, but is likely to impact small
sellers.
86
The transition coefficients imply several intuitive effects. A higher value of δB, for
example a lower broker price, implies that δNB is more likely to increase, i.e., that
non-brokers are likely to lower their prices, and that if non-broker listings enter they
will do so at higher δNB. These effects should create an incentive for the broker to
keep his price high when the market is inactive. On the other hand, there are effects
that offset this incentive. For example, a lower broker price makes it more likely
that non-broker listings will exit, raising the broker’s future demand, and creating
an incentive for the broker to lower his price early on in order to drive other listings
out. δNB also affects the broker’s pricing rule in an intuitive way, with lower non-
broker prices making it more likely that the broker will set a lower price.
3.6 Counterfactuals: Optimal Prices
This section describes the counterfactuals that we have run, calculating the broker’s
optimal price under various scenarios. Our focus at the moment is to compare the
level and time profile of the broker’s current prices with those which our model
predicts should be optimal. We can also investigate how the broker’s profits and
optimal policies vary with the model’s parameters. This can help to tell us more
about the economics of the pricing problem, but it can also provide useful advice to
the broker. For example, we can consider how valuable it is to change price more
frequently.
It is important to note that when we consider the broker changing his price we
allow for non-brokers to change their prices, or possibly enter or exit the market,
according to these transitions. However, we assume that the value of the parameters
of these functions would not change, i.e., we do not try to re-compute the full equilib-
rium of the pricing model. Our approach to performing counterfactuals is therefore
similar to the one used in recent papers such as Benkard et al. (2010).
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3.6.1 Calculations in a Base Case
We now explain how the broker’s optimal price is calculated using the simplest
example where the broker has two tickets to sell and his listing’s ROW=10. We
assume that the broker can change his price once each day, at the start of the day.
For any value of this price, call it pB, we calculate expected revenues in the following
steps, starting one day before the game when the price set is pT1B and the initial
non-broker state is δT1NB :
(i) calculate the value of δB associated with pT1B and ROW=10;
(ii) calculate the probability that the listing is sold within the next 24 hours using
the appropriate transition matrix, P p24q and the initial state;
(iii) calculate the value of the expected payoff to pT1B where the payoff is equal
to
pT1B Prpsale | δBppT1B q, δT1NB ,Θq (3.13)
which implicitly assumes that the broker has no value from unsold tickets and Θ are
all of the parameters estimated above;
(iv) for each state δNB find the optimal price, i.e., the price that maximizes the
payoff. The associated payoff is the “value” V T1pδNBq to being in state δT1NB with
one day remaining;
(v) repeat the calculations in (i)-(iv) for the previous day pT  2q where the
expected payoff is now
pT2B Pr

sale at T  2 | δppT2B q, δT2NB ,Θ
	
 
¸
k
V T1pδT1pkqqPr

δT1NB pkq andno sale in T  2 | δBppT2B q, δT2NB ,Θ
	
(3.14)
so the broker takes into account how the price that he sets at T  2 may influence
the transition of δNB, which he cares about if he does not sell;
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(vi) repeat (v) for T  3 and so until T  30.
This calculation assumes that the broker started with only two tickets to sell,
so that the game ends as soon as a single sale is made. However, the logic extends
quite naturally when we consider the broker having more tickets to sell. Suppose, for
example, that the broker has 4 seats to sell two days before the game. In this case,
he needs to take into account that, for a given price, he may sell all of his tickets
today (to two different buyers given his assumptions), or he may sell two tickets,
and so be left with two tickets to sell on the final day or he may sell no tickets and
have four to sell on the final day. This simply involves adding additional terms to
the calculation in 3.14.
3.6.2 Results
Base Case
Tables 3.7-3.9 show the optimal prices for each (day-to-game, non-broker state, num-
ber of tickets remaining) combination where we allow for the broker to start with
up to six tickets. The top line of each table shows the average price for that day,
averaging across non-broker states. Figure 3.7 compares these ‘average state’ paths
to the evolution of actual prices (based on the regression results in Table 3.4 where
we assume that the broker’s listings are in row 10).5
At least four features of these results deserve discussion.
(i) the broker sets prices that are of approximately the correct level immediately
before the game, which is when the market is most active. At this point, the pricing
problem is fairly close to being a static one (as future opportunities to sell are lim-
ited), and finding that the broker’s pricing decisions are consistent with our model
when the pricing problem is static provides some indirect evidence that our demand
5 We have also simulated what the average price would be given how the distribution of non-broker
states can vary over time, and given the ability of the broker to influence how the non-broker state
evolves. The differences in the average optimal prices are small, so we report average prices here.
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estimates, which determine the optimal static pricing policy, are approximately cor-
rect. It is also worth noting that the average level of prices around one month before
the game is also approximately correct for listings with 2 or 4 seats.
(ii) immediately before the game the optimal price are sensitive to the level of
competition δNB, as can be seen in Tables 3.7-3.9, with stronger competition implying
a lower optimal price, as one would expect in a static demand model. However, this
sensitivity declines as one moves further from the game, so that more than 10 days
before the game the optimal price is almost invariant to the non-broker state.6 This
reflects the fact that the broker knows that he is less likely to sell further from the
game and that it is possible that the non-broker state will improve over time, and
that by allowing low priced non-broker tickets to be sold, by setting a high price, the
broker may be able to encourage this.
We can compare these predictions with how the broker currently prices. In Ta-
ble 3.10 we repeat the regression reported in column (2) of Table 3.4, which used
broker listings, adding two variables. The first one measures the minimum price of
non-broker listings in the game-section and the second is a dummy variable that is
equal to one when there are no non-broker listings. In second column of Table 3.10
these variables are interacted with a count of many days there are until the game
to test whether the broker’s prices are more or less sensitive to these measures of
competition as a game approaches.
The positive coefficients on these variables in the first column indicate that the
broker sets higher prices when he faces less competition. The effects are large relative
to what an optimal pricing strategy would predict. For example, the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the minimum price variable are 0.54 and 0.80, so that moving between
these two values would predict that the broker’s relative price should increase by 0.08.
6 We note that the highest δNB is an obvious exception to this statement and we are in the process
of figuring out why.
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Optimal prices only display anything comparable to this sensitivity in the last couple
of days before the game, and not on average. Similarly no non-broker competition
implies a price increase of almost 0.25, which is a much larger effect than we see for
optimal prices.
In the second column these additional variables are interacted with the number
of days to go before the game. The coefficients on the main effects are zero, indicat-
ing insignificant differences immediately before the game, whereas optimal pricing
implies large differences. In contrast, the positive coefficients on the interactions
indicate that the prices are sensitive further from the game, and once again this is
the opposite of what the optimal pricing results predict.
(iii) the optimal pricing policy involves setting lower prices when there are more
tickets to sell as multiple purchases will be required to clear the inventory. This
reflects a standard feature of dynamic pricing models (e.g., McAfee and Te Velde
(2006)) where the opportunity cost of sale of a given seat decreases with the number
of seats left to sell, which causes the optimal price to fall.In contrast, the broker
sets similar current prices for listings with 2, 4 or 6 seats. This suggests that there
may be gains (which we could quantify) to raising prices are subsets of seats from a
listing are sold. One caveat here is that our assumption that buyers only ever want
to purchase two seats probably leads to larger differences in optimal prices. In future
revisions we will allow for some buyers to want four seats, and it will be interesting
to see how much the differences in optimal prices fall;
(iv) while actual and optimal prices both fall as a game approaches the shape of
the declines is not the same. Optimal prices have a concave time profile, which is
exactly dynamic pricing models usually predict even in the absence of competition
and intertemporal changes in market activity (see, for example, the simulations in
McAfee and Te Velde (2006)). Adding these factors should make a concave (i.e.,
quickening pace of decline with initially fairly flat prices) even more optimal, as the
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optimizing seller will place more value on trying to keep competitors’ prices high (by
not cutting his own price) and less weight on trying to sell tickets early on by cutting
prices because buyers are scarce. In contrast, the broker’s actual prices decline fairly
steadily starting about two weeks before the game, when we estimate that there
are still relatively few consumers in the market, so that even with the price cut the
probability of sale is low. We also fail to explain the small jump in the broker’s prices
that is observed about two weeks before the game. This is hard to explain in our
model without introducing some additional element such as a change in the price
elasticity of buyers’ who enter the market during this period of time.7
Frequency of Price Setting
In future revisions we will vary many of the parameters to investigate how they affect
optimal pricing and the relationship between optimal prices and the prices that we
observe in the data. Here we investigate the role of how frequently the broker sets
prices, holding the remaining parameters fixed.
The base case assumed that the broker updates prices once per day which is more
frequently than we estimate happens in the data. To be precise our estimates imply
that the probability that the broker updates his prices at least once during the day
is 0.73 for 0-5 days before the game, 0.41 5-10 days before, 0.26 11-20 days before
and 0.21 more than 21 days before the game. Figure 3.8 shows how optimal prices
change when we assume that the broker updates with these probabilities, with the
λB prices indicating the price that the broker should set if he gets the opportunity to
change his price, knowing that he may not be able to change his price in the future.
The key finding is that the when price changes are less frequent the broker should
7 Interestingly when we estimated a more flexible demand model that allow for the price coefficient
to vary with the number of days until the game we did estimate that demand was less elastic with
two weeks ago than either more than 20 days or less than 10 days before the game, although the
difference in the coefficients was not statistically significant.
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set lower prices because there is some probability that the broker will be stuck with
his earlier prices when the (unconstrained) optimal price falls. On the other hand,
updating close to the game is sufficiently likely that the differences in optimal prices
in the last few days are actually quite small.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an empirical framework for analyzing settings where a seller
faces both a dynamic pricing problem and significant competition, and is able to
influence how his competition evolves when he sets his price. We estimate our model
using data from a large broker who sells event tickets on Stubhub. In the data we
see that the prices that the broker sets appear to significantly affect the prices of his
competitors, as well as affecting the probability with which his tickets are sold. We
find evidence that the broker’s current pricing rules are optimal in some respects but
not in others. For example, close to the game, when the market is most active, the
broker sets prices that are approximately the right level to maximize revenues. On
the other hand, the broker’s prices further from the game are (i) too insensitive to
the number of tickets that the broker has left; (ii) too sensitive to the current level of
competition that the broker faces; and (iii) updated less frequently than what would
have been optimal. In future revisions we flesh out these differences in more detail.
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Table 3.1: Number of Successful Downloads Each Day For Each Game (more than
8 downloads listed as 8, days more than 45 prior to game not listed)
Days Prior Game
to Game 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0 7 6 6 0 1 6 8 8 8 8 8 5 8 8
1 8 8 8 0 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
2 8 8 8 4 1 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
3 8 8 8 8 0 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
4 8 8 8 8 3 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
5 1 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
6 3 8 8 8 8 1 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
7 8 1 8 8 8 1 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 8 3 8 8 8 1 1 6 8 8 8 6 8 8
9 8 8 1 8 8 0 1 1 8 8 8 7 8 8
10 8 8 3 8 8 3 1 1 6 8 8 8 8 8
11 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 1 1 8 8 8 8 8
12 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 1 1 8 8 8 8 8
13 6 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 1 8 8 8 8 8
14 5 8 8 1 8 8 3 1 1 8 8 8 8 8
15 4 5 8 3 8 8 8 0 1 6 8 7 8 8
16 8 6 8 8 8 8 8 3 1 1 8 8 8 8
17 8 4 5 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 8 8 8 8
18 5 8 6 8 8 8 8 8 3 1 8 8 8 8
19 5 8 4 8 6 8 8 8 8 1 8 8 8 8
20 5 3 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 1 6 7 8 8
21 1 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 1 8 8 8
22 3 3 3 5 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 4 8 8
23 1 1 2 6 8 8 8 8 8 3 1 1 8 8
24 2 2 1 4 7 8 8 8 8 8 1 1 8 8
25 0 1 1 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 1 1 8 8
26 0 2 2 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 1 1 8 8
27 0 0 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 6 8
28 0 0 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3 1 1 8
29 0 0 0 8 8 8 6 8 8 8 8 0 1 6
30 0 0 0 0 5 7 7 8 8 8 7 0 1 1
31 0 0 0 2 0 8 8 7 8 8 8 0 1 1
32 0 0 0 1 0 8 8 7 8 8 8 0 1 1
33 0 0 0 2 0 8 8 8 6 8 8 0 1 1
34 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 8 8 8 8 5 0 1
35 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3 1
36 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 0
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 7 6 8 8 8 8
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 8 8 8 8 8
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 7 8 8 8
44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 7 8 8 8
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 6 8 8
No. of Broker Sales 66 50 66 65 116 149 111 69 150 59 76 37 81 77
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Table 3.3: Number of Seats in Broker Sale
Number of Seats Transactions % of Transactions
1 45 2.57
2 940 53.59
3 284 16.19
4 332 18.93
5 68 3.88
6 56 3.19
7 10 0.57
8 14 0.80
9 2 0.11
10 3 0.17
Total 1,754 100
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Table 3.4: Price Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-Broker Broker Non-Broker Broker Broker
Listings Listings Listings Listings Transactions
Sample Full Full Estimation Estimation Full
Ave Price 0 to 2 Days Before Game 0.84 0.47 0.64 0.46 0.41
Days-to-go coefficients
2 to 4 days 0.305*** 0.0975*** 0.168*** 0.106*** 0.0590***
(0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) 0.014
5 to 7 days 0.292*** 0.216*** 0.239*** 0.235*** 0.107***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.020) (0.027) 0.016
8 to 10 days 0.284*** 0.342*** 0.276*** 0.362*** 0.118***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) 0.02
11 to 13 days 0.304*** 0.498*** 0.294*** 0.517*** 0.220***
(0.033) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 0.029
14 to 16 days 0.309*** 0.519*** 0.305*** 0.528*** 0.203***
(0.030) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) 0.036
17 to 19 days 0.300*** 0.401*** 0.304*** 0.387*** 0.217***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) 0.025
20 to 22 days 0.320*** 0.442*** 0.323*** 0.408*** 0.223***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027) 0.027
23 to 28 days 0.291*** 0.458*** 0.333*** 0.427*** 0.177***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 0.024
29 to 34 days 0.291*** 0.491*** 0.337*** 0.451*** 0.154***
(0.034) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) 0.029
35 or more days 0.305*** 0.560*** 0.411*** 0.534*** 0.112***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) 0.028
Number of seats (2 = excluded category)
1 -0.315*** -0.407*** -0.251*** -0.594*** -0.305***
(0.035) (0.057) (0.043) (0.028) 0.11
3 0.304*** 0.0412* -0.0233 0.0288 -0.00889
(0.058) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) 0.015
4 0.213*** -0.0028 0.0464* 0.000462 0.00391
(0.019) (0.015) (0.025) (0.018) 0.0086
5 0.405*** 0.0153 -0.00565 0.0000518 0.0162
(0.050) (0.017) (0.027) (0.022) 0.012
6 0.262*** 0.0409* -0.125*** 0.0514** 0.00397
(0.023) (0.021) (0.030) (0.026) 0.0099
7+ 0.325*** 0.0111 -0.106*** -0.0402 0.0102
(0.057) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) 0.0093
Team performance (league rank)
Home 0.0114*** 0.0553*** 0.00584** 0.0563*** 0.0123***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 0.0028
Away -0.00172 0.00881*** 0.000798 0.0038 -0.00694**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 0.0033
Game-face value fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Row Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,455,198 87,401 244,896 53,022 1172
R-squared 0.21 0.7 0.59 0.72 0.71
Note: standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on the game. ***,** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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Table 3.5: First Stage Estimates
Parameter Std. Error
Demand (X)
Constant 3.4621 (0.7870)
Price (relative to face) -6.1270 (0.6833)
Row -0.0507 (0.0205)
Arrival (W)
Constant -5.6897 (0.2855)
I(4 ticket people) -0.3998 (0.1206)
I(6 ticket people) -0.8741 (0.2783)
DTG0to5 2.9138 (0.1613)
DTG6to10 1.8241 (0.2069)
DTG11to20 1.4052 (0.2000)
DTG21to30 0.8094 (0.1968)
Weekend -0.2122 (0.1106)
Daytime 1.7024 (0.1952)
Nighttime 1.7297 (0.2087)
Table 3.6: Second Stage Estimates
Parameter Std. Error Parameter Std. Error
λ - B move NB transition
0-5 days to go 0.0551 (0.0035) Constant 0.4923 (0.0501)
6-10 0.0220 (0.0021) B state 0.1024 (0.0243)
11-20 0.0127 (0.0010) NB state 1.0143 (0.0334)
21-30 0.0097 (0.0009) sigma 0.6113 (0.0396)
λ - NB move B transition
0-5 days to go 0.0676 (0.0061) Constant 1.1978 (1.0522)
6-10 0.0272 (0.0031) B state 1.0612 (0.3495)
11-20 0.0208 (0.0018) NB state 1.0271 (0.2985)
21-30 0.0171 (0.0016) I(No NB listing) 3.6013 (1.2180)
sigma 3.9054 (0.5728)
λ - NB exit
0-5 days to go 0.0331 (0.0062) NB exiting
6-10 0.0104 (0.0042) B state 1.7093 (0.4335)
11-20 0.0058 (0.0021) NB state -1.0185 (0.3702)
21-30 0.0029 (0.0009) Bstate*NBstate -0.1089 (0.0762)
λ - NB enter NB entering
0-5 days to go 0.0539 (0.0069) B state 1.5853 (0.2235)
6-10 0.0131 (0.0048) NB state -0.0348 (0.0355)
11-20 0.0068 (0.0023) Bstate*NBstate 0.0534 (0.0207)
21-30 0.0032 (0.0016)
λ - Consumer
0-5 days to go 0.2326 (0.0114)
6-10 0.0714 (0.0073)
11-20 0.0431 (0.0039)
21-30 0.0363 (0.0030)
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Table 3.10: Price Regressions With Competition Effects
(1) (2)
Broker Broker
Listings Listings
Sample Full Full
Average Price 0 to 2 Days Before Game 0.47 0.47
Days-to-go coefficients
2 to 4 days 0.091*** 0.101***
(0.022) (0.024)
5 to 7 days 0.192*** 0.196***
(0.027) (0.027)
8 to 10 days 0.297*** 0.310***
(0.027) (0.026)
11 to 13 days 0.444*** 0.419***
(0.026) (0.026)
14 to 16 days 0.463*** 0.402***
(0.025) (0.027)
17 to 19 days 0.352*** 0.269***
(0.027) (0.029)
20 to 22 days 0.385*** 0.267***
(0.031) (0.032)
23 to 28 days 0.397*** 0.252***
(0.029) (0.030)
29 to 34 days 0.426*** 0.232***
(0.028) (0.031)
35 or more days 0.481*** 0.200***
(0.026) (0.035)
Minimum Non-Broker Price 0.311*** -0.015
(0.051) (0.038)
No Non-Broker Listings 0.244*** 0.025
(0.043) (0.034)
DTG* Minimum Non-Broker Price - 0.007***
(0.001)
DTG*No Non-Broker Listings - 0.006***
(0.001)
Game-face value fixed effects Y Y
Row, # of seat and team performance controls Y Y
Observations 87,401 87,401
R-squared 0.73 0.76
Note: standard errors in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on
the game. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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Figure 3.1: Broker Prices
Figure 3.2: Timing of Broker Sales
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Figure 3.3: Price Paths
Figure 3.4: Broker Sales Rate
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Figure 3.5: Average Number of Listings for Game
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(a) Broker δ
(b) Non-Broker δ
Figure 3.6: Bins for δ State Variables
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(a) Optimal Prices with Daily Price Changes
(b) Average Price for Row 10 seats
Figure 3.7: Optimal Pricing Compared with Actual Average Prices
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Figure 3.8: Optimal Prices with Daily and Estimated Price Setting
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Appendix A
Invertibility of Market Share Function in GEV
Model
In this appendix, I show the invertibility of market share function discussed in BLP
(1995) can be extended to the case of GEV model with a slight modification. They
define a function f : RK Ñ RK . If the following conditions are satisfied, then there
is a unique fixed point x0 to f in RK .
1. @x P RK , fpxq is continuously differentiable with @j and k, Bfjpxq{Bxk ¥ 0
and
°K
k1 Bfjpxq{Bxk   1.
2. minj infx fpxq  x ¡  inf.
3. There is a value, x¯, with the property that if for any j, xj ¥ x¯, then for some
k, fkpxq   xk.
Conditions (2) and (3) are trivial in our case, so I only show the proof for condition
(1). Consider fpδq  δ   minltρlu rlogpsq  logpspδqqs. In our demand model,
Gpeδq  eδ0  
¸
l
al
¸
k
¸
j
Ipj, k, lqe
δj
ρl
ρlff
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and
sj 
1
Gpeδq
¸
l
ale
δj
ρl
¸
j1
Ipj1, kjl, lqe
δ
j1
ρl
ρl1

°
l ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl
G
.
We could show that
Bfj
Bδj
 1   mintρlusj 
¸
l

mintρlu
ρl

 ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl°
l ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl



1  p1  ρlqe
δj
ρl
Tjl

¡ 0
and for m  j,
Bfj
Bδm
 mintρlu

sm ¸
l

ρl  1
ρl

 ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl°
l ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl

Ipm, kjl, lqe δmρl
Tjl
fifl ¡ 0.
In addition,
¸
m
Bfj
Bδm
 1   mintρlu
¸
m
sm 
¸
l

1
ρl

 ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl°
l ale
δj
ρl T ρl1jl



1  p1  ρlq
°
m Ipm, kjl, lqe
δm
ρl
Tjl
ff
 1   mintρlu
¸
m
sm  1

  1.
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Appendix B
Identifying Broker Listings in the StubHub Data
In this section, we discuss how we identified broker’s listings in the StubHub data.
From the broker we have a record of sales transactions. This record indicates the
number of seats sold, transaction time, the game, section, row, and number of seats,
and the platform on which the tickets were sold (usually StubHub). From StubHub
we have a record of all the tickets listed (by anyone, not just the broker) for each
game-section-row at various points in time. The data was gathered from the Stub-
Hub website approximately every 3 hours from December 2009 to April 2010.
Since the listings on StubHub are anonymous, we need to identify broker’s listings
in the StubHub data based on the available information. To accomplish this we first
generated a variable called BrokerTrans, which is equal to one for a listing when
tickets disappear from that listing at the next download and the timing and number
of seats match with a sale recorded in the broker data. Then, we use logical tests in
Stata to create categories for the StubHub listings. Below is a description for each
category. Each description includes an explanation of the logical test performed and
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the rationale behind the category.
1. BrokerTicket1 : This variable identifies StubHub listings which are the only
ones in a game-section-download that match the number of seats held by the
broker at the time of the listing. The variable equals one if the number of seats
match, and zero otherwise. By definition, the listings with BrokerTrans equal
to one must have BrokerTicket1 equal to one as well.
2. BrokerTicket2 : This variable works backward by recognizing when a broker’s
transaction has occurred, and then identifying the listings leading up to the
transaction. If we find a listing for a game-section-row the only one that
matches the broker data and BrokerTicket1 equals zero, then BrokerTicket2
equals one for this listing and for listings with the same number of seats when
they appear at earlier download times. BrokerTicket2 is less restrictive than
BrokerTicket1 in that it does not require the number of seats on the listing to
match the number held by the broker. This accounts for the possibility that
the broker did not list all tickets together simultaneously on StubHub.
3. ProbableBrokerTicket1 : This variable follows BrokerTicket1 except it identifies
multiple listings from the same download time with the same number of seats.
For instance, if the broker has four seats for a particular game-section-row and
there are two listings of four seats on StubHub, BrokerTicket1 equals zero for
both listings since it cannot distinguish between the two identical listings. In
this case ProbableBrokerTicket1 equals one for both listings.
4. ProbableBrokerTicket2 : This variable follows BrokerTicket1, but it allows for
the possibility that the order of transactions from the broker data is different
from the order on StubHub.
5. ProbableBrokerTicket3 : This variable is equal to one whenever the number of
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tickets held by the broker for a particular game-section-row is greater than the
total number of tickets listed for that game-section-row on StubHub and the
listing has BrokerTicket2 equal to zero.
6. PossibleBrokerTicket1 : This variable identifies tickets that are continuously
listed except for a single gap of 1 to 4 downloads (i.e. for a period of time
the tickets disappear but then reappear with the same price and the same
number of seats). This test is only applied to listings where BrokerTicket1 or
BrokerTicket2 equals one later.
7. PossibleBrokerTicket2 : This variable is similar to PossibleBrokerTicket1 ex-
cept the listing price must vary across the gap (number of seats must remain
the same).
8. PossibleBrokerTicket3 : This variable is the same as PossibleBrokerTicket1 ex-
cept the gap length is longer (5 or more downloads).
9. PossibleBrokerTicket4 : The same as PossibleBrokerTicket2 except the gap
length is longer (5 or more downloads).
Note that due to technical reasons, some broker transactions were not identified in
the StubHub data. For example, a broker transaction which happened when our
download system was down would not be found in the StuhHub data. Also, the
broker recorded transactions taking place on holidays in the morning of the business
days right after the holidays. This made the transaction time from the broker not
consistent with the time when the listings disappeared from StubHub during the
holidays. Table B.1 summarizes the results of the matching process.
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Table B.1: Matching Datasets
Category Number of Observations Percentage
BrokerTicket1 87,401 5.67%
BrokerTicket2 15,901 1.03%
ProbableBrokerTicket1 9,118 0.59%
ProbableBrokerTicket2 0 0.00%
ProbableBrokerTicket3 29,968 1.94%
PossibleBrokerTicket1 378 0.02%
PossibleBrokerTicket2 374 0.02%
PossibleBrokerTicket3 4 0.00%
PossibleBrokerTicket4 9 0.00%
Non-Broker 1,399,446 90.72%
Total 1,542,599 100.00%
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